

Bulletin des Artilleurs de Montréal

Sheldrake's Log

Montreal Gunners Newsletter



Fall 2003

Vol. 35 No. 2

President's message by Maj (Ret) Charles de Kovachich

Dear fellow Gunners,

The association has developed a busy social calendar for the fall, and I would like to report it to you. Firstly, as you know, last April a decision was taken to end the last Friday of the month luncheons. After three years we were never able to raise the attendance for this event to the level that we had hoped for. On reflection, I think that although the armoury is reasonable close to the downtown core, most of the potential guests who could come to the event are scattered throughout the island of Montreal. For those who came, it became a time consuming event and because it was during the working day this became too onerous. I conclude that the era of the two hour lunches are over.

We have replaced this get together with a combined event with the Regiment as a series of professional development lectures offered to the leadership of the unit. This will also act as a forum to discuss items of current interest to the association membership. The event will take place on a selected Tuesday night when the Regiment is training. A buffet dinner will be offered, the bar will be opened and the cost is only 15\$ for members. We are planning to invite members of other associations within the Montreal region when the topics are of general interest.

We are very honoured to have the **Colonel Commandant** for our first lecture. He will be there on Tuesday the 18th of November starting at 1800 hours at the officer's mess. The Colonel Commandant will discuss current development within the Artillery in Canada.

The Honourary Colonel, the Honourary Lieutenant Colonel and the CO will be present at this lecture. It will be a great occasion to meet these gentlemen in a relaxed setting. I encourage you to confirm your attendance by mail or by e-mail to L Col (ret) Bernard Lefebvre at:

bernard.lefebvre@notes.canadair.ca.

The schedule of lectures will be coming out soon as lecturing guests are confirmed. We will look forward to your participation.

Also on the calendar this fall, is a visit to Montreal by Lt Gen (ret) Romeo Dalair. As you may know, he is launching a book describing his experiences in Rwanda in 1994 as commander of the UN contingent. He will be addressing a select group of individuals at the Mount Stephen Club on Monday, November 17th from 12 to 2 o'clock. The cost is 50\$ per person and there are only a few seat available to reserve. Some members of the Regiment will attend this lecture. Please reserve your tickets by contacting LCol Pierre Fecteau at: pfcteau@hampsteadcameron.com.

This year the St-Barbara's dinner for the whole province will be held at our armoury. It will take place on December 12th at the usual timings (7 for 8) and the usual dress. You will receive formal invitations in the mail, but this is the warning order to put it in your agenda now.

On October 25 the association presented the plaque that will be placed beside the M114 howitzer beside the armoury. A parade was held during which I had the privilege to

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The Carrier Option By Nic Boisvert

When 'Bonnie' was scrapped in 1970, the Canadian Navy wistfully thought it had seen the last of aircraft carriers. Too expensive and vulnerable to Soviet attack, they were just too politically expendable. Three decades later, strategic circumstances have changed. Thoughtful voices from many quarters demand a new look at the old idea, in guise of a 'littoral warfare ship'. First resurrected by the Royal Canadian Military Institute in spring 2001, and seconded soon thereafter by CCS21's David Bercuson, it is now a centerpiece of the Canadian Alliance Defence Policy White Paper, *The New North Strong and Free*. Lew Mackenzie's endorsement has gained approving headlines.

And it's not just Canada that has the bug. Reflecting on recent British experience in Iraq, military analyst John Keegan made his public conversion in the *Daily Telegraph*: "if [two new] carriers are not built and properly equipped, a shadow will fall over the whole of Britain's defence capability." Easy enough said for Britain, which like the US and France has a tradition of operating large deck carriers (India and Argentina have maintained it on a smaller scale). But Italy, Spain, Thailand and Brazil among others are getting in on the act.

So why shouldn't we? Our Navy arguably has the professional competence, as do the Army and Air Force, and the idea seems tailor-made for the new spirit of jointness infecting the Canadian Forces. The carrier option certainly would inject significant combat capability. But it can be as much of a trap as an opportunity if not pursued with our eyes wide open.

Two important factors are driving the carrier renaissance. First, with no peer competitor to the US Navy's mastery of the high seas, the operational focus of militaries everywhere has shifted to power projection in the world's littorals. Second, the previously prohibitive complexity of carrier aviation promises to be simplified immensely by a new generation of technology, in the form of vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) aircraft such as the Osprey

and the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). Carriers are becoming affordable, and opportunities for employment abound.

So far, so good. The Chief of Defence Staff has declared 'expeditionary operations' as the continuing rationale of the CF. The Air Force is engaged in the JSF project. The naval staff admits "practically all of the CF's eight capability areas could be fulfilled most effectively by an aircraft carrier" (they are listed in *Strategic Capability Planning for the Canadian Forces*, http://www.vcds.dnd.ca/dgsp/dda/strat/intro_e.asp).

Oddly enough, then, none of the new Canadian voices are from the Navy, or for that matter elsewhere in the CF. *Leadmark: The Navy's Strategy for 2020* does not contain the words 'aircraft carrier' except in an historical context. The Army goes nowhere near the term 'amphibious' in its *Advancing with Purpose*. Presumably neither would the Air Force, when its future strategy eventually appears.

The generals and admirals have cause to take pause. For starters, acquisition of aircraft carriers (note the plural) would demand a force structure much larger than present. A single carrier would be a one-shot wonder with no operational depth. The CF's 3:1 force ratio realistically suggests at least four to ensure that. Accepting that such vessels would look more like the Royal Navy's HMS *Ocean* than the much larger USS *Nimitz* still implies a CF trained effective strength closer to 100,000 than the present 50,000.

And then there is the problem of a concept of operations. Such a radically different force structure almost certainly demands a CONOP very different from the present. OK – so no one knows what the present one is. But it certainly does not comprise an Army geared for amphibious landings, even if nominally 'administrative' (ie, non-opposed), or an Air Force capable of direct sea-based close air support, or a Navy centered around a high value unit requiring constant protection.

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Résumé d'un discours / Summary of a speech par / by Maj (Ret) Charles de Kovachich

Au nom de l'association des artilleurs de Montréal c'est avec fierté que nous vous présentons aujourd'hui une plaque commémorative en l'honneur de tous les artilleurs qui ont servi nos canons. Cette plaque sera installée sur une pièce d'artillerie le M114. Un canon d'un calibre de 155mm qui nécessite un équipage de 11 personnes pour le faire fonctionner. L'histoire de ce canon remonte à 1942 ce qui dans le contexte du service des artilleurs nous situe dans l'ère moderne.

Quoique cette pièce d'artillerie soit une arme de combat elle représente un symbole de service, de devoir et d'engagement envers notre pays que toute personne en uniforme qui porte l'emblème des artilleurs partage. Depuis la fabrication de ce canon en 1942 jusqu'à maintenant les artilleurs savent qu'ils sont des instruments de service envers leurs compatriotes.

The operation of this gun requires the coordinated effort of 11 people working harmoniously as a team. Each member of the team is important to put the gun in battery. One gunner will set the sight, one will prepare the ammunition, one will set the fuses etc. In this manner each person in the gunner family is important and can contribute to our community. Each contribution adds to the collective effort, because we are all part of a team. This team being stronger than any individual.

Les artilleurs savent que nous n'avons pas besoin d'un conflit armée pour servir. Ils savent aussi que nous ne sommes pas obligés de servir avec nos canons. Le travail de nos soldats dans nos missions de paix à travers le monde est bien documenté. Cependant, il ne faut pas oublier l'intervention de nos artilleurs pendant la tempête de verglas ici même à Montréal et en Montérégie ainsi que pendant les inondations au Manitoba. Soulignons aussi le travail que fait le lieutenant général Roméo Dallaire, lui-même un artilleur, pour aider le



monde entier à mieux comprendre les événements du Rwanda en 1994. Une fois que nous sommes membres de la grande famille des artilleurs au Canada le service envers autrui fait partie de nos habitudes de vie.

Je tiens à remercier les membres de l'équipe qui ont contribué à produire cette plaque. Je commence par l'adjudant-chef Normand Roberge qui en a eu l'idée. Je tiens aussi à nommer le colonel Gilbert Saint-Louis ainsi que le bombardier Glenn Davis qui ont collaboré au libellé de la plaque.

Fellow gunners, thank you for participating in this ceremony.

L'association des artilleurs de Montréal a besoin d'augmenter le nombre de ces membres.

Le bouche à oreille est une des meilleures formes de publicités.

Invite un ami ou une connaissance à joindre l'association afin de profiter d'un climat de franche camaraderie et d'amitié.

ON GUARD FOR US? The state of Canada's military

By Desmond Morton *

What is the present state of Canada's military?

Canada's military is worn out, after many years of economy, as it was worn out during every other period of peace time. In a very tough budgetary situation, it has been difficult to persuade the government to make new capital acquisitions to replace old equipment, so the military have fallen into obsolescence.

What kind of armed forces should Canada have?

We have had a priority since Confederation to ensure that the Americans are not worried about their northern frontier. That was the brilliant defence solution that the first confederation government came up with, and I think the Chrétien government is unaware of it.

That is our responsibility, but is it a military, naval, air force responsibility? In part, but chiefly it is a police, customs, and CSIS (Canadian Security Intelligence Service) responsibility. After 9/11, when the government put money aside to make the border more secure, very little of it went to the Department of National Defence - to their fury and indignation. But why should the money go there? Does Osama Ben Laden own submarines? Does he have missiles? Aside from some small anti-aircraft missiles, no. So the military's response was inappropriate at the time.

You mention in your latest book, Understanding Canadian Defence, that there is pressure on us to replicate what the American military has. Why aren't we doing that?

We could, if we chose to do so, finance as much defence spending per capita as the Americans, up to 4% of our GNP. When I lecture, I tell audiences that we could do this by raising the Goods and Services Tax to 25%, for example;

all in favour, say aye. Nobody does. We could take half the cost of Medicare, and privatize the other half, to find the money. Nobody, certainly not in older audiences, says yes to that. Or, we could do what George W Bush has done, which is to go back to having a roaring deficit, and great financial instability. Nobody seems keen on that, either.

So when I present audiences with realistic, tough alternatives saying that you can have it if you're willing to pay they're not willing.

You say we're not in favour of increased defence spending because we haven't been directly threatened in the past. Is the threat of terrorism changing that?

What changed is that the Americans closed their border, and suddenly, a billion dollars a day was not crossing the border, on the 12th, 13th and 14th of September, 2001. That's a big problem because we have tied our trade to one customer, and our imports to one supplier. That's where terrorism hit Canadians: in the pocketbook. That's why the border matters, and will until we can diversify our trade, which I don't anticipate happening five, ten or even 50 years from now.

We were hit, not by explosions, but by the fear that we would be held responsible for what happened. And I think we all underestimated the level of fear and panic that the 9/11 attacks had on our American neighbours.

Should Canada specialize in certain areas of defence, say, special forces or chemical/biological weapons detection, instead of maintaining a general defence program?

If I was confident that any of us knew what was going to happen, I might be prepared to buy into that. But on the whole, our capacity to prophesy has been abysmal, and our military prophesies have been worse than abysmal. I

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have spent some time looking at our white papers over the years, and the one thing that our defence white papers have consistently been is wrong. They always predicted something as absolutely certain, and it never happened.

Does under funding the military affect other Canadian interests in foreign affairs, diplomacy and trade?

That's hard to say. Actually, it's easy to say but hard to prove. Canadians are supposed to be up there with the best, and the military argue that if we aren't, we lose influence in Washington. We are told that the softwood lumber deal went badly because we weren't with the Americans in Iraq. I don't think that's true, but how do I know? There is a powerful U.S. softwood lumber industry lobby, and it works better in Congress than any number of Canadian diplomats. They have votes down there, and we don't.

When you make yourself the sole supplier to your customer, your customer is king. That's the end of sovereignty. There are other arguments (for military involvement) than simply not participating in George Bush's favourite war.

Canadians have long taken pride in our forces' capabilities as peacekeepers. Can we still fulfill that role?

What do they take pride in? I'm not sure they understand the role, or ever did. When we went into peacekeeping, it was presented to Canadians as a very idealistic activity but not by the military, who understood that they were fulfilling a perfectly rational alliance role. In Cyprus, on the southern flank of NATO, the Greeks and the Turks were practically at war over an island in the Mediterranean. When we sent troops, it was fundamentally as a NATO responsibility. So I see peacekeeping as very *realpolitik*. We went to Vietnam to help the Americans get out of a situation they had gotten into too deeply, and to Indochina 12 years earlier to try to save them, too. Peacekeeping is part of our international North

Atlantic Treaty cold war responsibilities. At the core of all those problems was that if we didn't do something, the Russians would.

Did the end of the Cold War change the role of our military?

Well, we clearly don't worry about northern air space any longer, if we ever did. After the Cold War, we got involved in parts of the world that were anything but peaceful. When we went into Yugoslavia, a sovereign country, to sort out tribal conflicts, that was very different from anything that we did in peacekeeping before 1991. These were dangerous situations and people got killed; that happened in previous peacekeeping, but usually by accident. Now we go in not to keep the peace but to enforce it, and that's a somewhat imperialistic role. In effect we are telling the people in these countries, "You guys can't manage, we're here to help you, and if you don't like it, get out of the way." That's not the kind of gentle, soft peacekeeping that Canadians seem to believe that we practice.

When we went to Somalia, we got into terrible trouble. But we landed there as a foreign country, armed and loaded, ready to shoot our way off the airplanes, because we expected to be met with gunfire. That wasn't peacekeeping, it was peacemaking.

What's the difference between peacekeeping and peacemaking?

Peacekeeping is when both sides have agreed to peace, but can't quite guarantee that everybody is going to be obeying the message. Peacemaking is when you have a monstrous situation going on, from genocide to mass disorder. You go in, like a police force into a riot, and you enforce order. If you arrive with enough force and terrify people, they will, by and large, stand silently by. But if they think they can take you on, they'll shoot you.

The Americans and British seemed unprepared for the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion. Why do you think that is?

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They were certainly well prepared for the war effort; nobody seemed to be very interested in how you handle Iraq after it was defeated. To me, that should have been sufficient warning not to get involved in this sort of thing. The aftermath is the key part. The people who opposed it were very often U.S. army officers who did understand enough to know that the Americans were moving into something they really hadn't measured or prepared for.

I am concerned that Canadians are going to Kabul at a time when you can sense, across Afghanistan, the mustering of resistance. Countries don't like to be invaded; while Afghans spend most of their time fighting each other, after a while they figure out that there is one common enemy. When they do, they go after it, with considerable avidity.

The U.S. is calling for an international force to assist on the ground in Iraq. Should Canada join in?

At the moment, we have committed so many troops to Kabul that we don't have anything left. We can't do it, unless it was a major policy re-commitment of substantial funds.

Vietnam and Russia's war in Afghanistan showed that committed guerillas can defeat a modern army. Does a high-tech military mean you understand less about the enemy?

There is no mystery about how to deal with terrorist guerillas and the like. The Nazis handled resistance movements in Europe through a simple, awful method: utter brutality. So villages would not shelter the Marquis (the French resistance) because if they did, they would be annihilated. It's horrible to say, but it works. How do you do that with CNN and other modern media free to take pictures and ask people what's going on? You can't.

That's what inhibits the Israelis in dealing with the Palestinians, and the Americans in dealing with Iraqis. Because it's a ghastly,

unfair, unjust, genocidal way of treating people. So yes, the military can cope with this kind of problem, but not in any way acceptable to civilized people. The military know that, and many of them were deeply opposed to getting involved in a no-win situation. We can see they're right, but who else does? President Bush? No, he blames anyone in sight for not helping.

What should the Canadian public and policymakers understand about our military?

They are people who have lots of institutional strengths and virtues, but they can't be misused as much as they often have been. They are people who believe in discipline and order, and you can't tear that out of them and still expect them to perform. At the same time, they will do as they are told, unlike most other institutions and individuals in our society. So understand them before you use them.

Professor Desmond Morton, historian and military expert, is a graduate of the Royal Military College who served for ten years in the Canadian Armed Forces. He was interviewed by Montreal writer Sylvain Comeau for the Fall 2003 issue of McGill News, the quarterly magazine of the McGill Alumni Association.

General Dallaire's book is published

Lieutenant-General Roméo Dallaire's book "Shake Hands With the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda" is now available. The English version is published by Random House Canada (\$39.95). The French version (*J'ai serré la main du diable*) is published by Libre Expression (\$36.95).

In the humble opinion of your Observer this is must read material for all of those concerned with peacekeeping and peacemaking issues; soldiers, civilians and politicians.

Connecting the Dots:

The Carrier Option, The Chrétien Doctrine, and Transformation of the Canadian Forces

By Nic Boisvert

What a summer. The Afghan deployment is off to a controversial start with a fuzzy mandate and “mission creep” already setting in (and that’s not just the traffic cops). An Ontario blackout exposes the flimsy structure of OCIPEP (the federal Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness). The Department of Foreign Affairs’ policy “consultation” was unveiled, offering all things to all comers and nothing of any substance, other than fodder for a legacy in what some wags have styled “the Chrétien Doctrine” (that would be the Responsibility to Protect, or “R2P”, the self-proclaimed obligation of advanced democracies to intervene unilaterally against foreign despots tyrannizing their populations). Except that a weak promotion by its namesake failed to gain R2P the support of Third Way world socialist governments, the parallels to US intervention in Iraq being just a little too obvious. Finally, there is John Manley’s renewed claw-back (make that “re-allocation”) of \$200M from the DND budget, even as troops battle BC fires and the cost of the Kabul deployment balloons to \$1B.

Before setting to new business, however, a need to close off some old. The “carrier option” column generated much interest and some criticism, so here’s an attempt at fuller development of some aspects while making certain other links.

Several readers took issue with the failure to distinguish among aircraft carriers, amphibious assault ships, and the range of other “floating things with flat tops”. That was the point – there are choices to be made. Generically, we’re talking about ships big enough to launch aircraft that can land and support troops in sustained operations ashore. Such a potentially offensive capability demands a fundamental re-thinking of how we do “defence” in this country. Whatever option

is selected would require a radically different Canadian Forces structure and concept of operations from the present, let alone a government that understands the application of military force for political ends. However one might style it, the Amphibious Support Ship is a capability that must be pulled from the needs of Canadian foreign policy, not pushed from the wishful thinking of those (including this writer) who see Canada as capable of so much more militarily than we undertake at present. Until a Canadian government formally commits to something like the Chrétien Doctrine – let alone gets fellow travelers to buy into it – there is a very limited foreign policy imperative for Canadian Forces capable of such robust action.

That is not to say the CF should ignore world trends toward “amphibiosity”. But there is a big difference between being able to operate “from the sea” in support of coalition operations ashore, and actually possessing the capability to force an issue independently. The former is achievable within the context of the existing CF structure (with a modest infusion of capital and personnel, and a willingness to participate with allies), while the latter requires a fundamental and costly restructuring of our military. What should be done depends on how broken one sees the present CF.

Which makes the inaugural performance of the new Chief of the Land Staff all the more puzzling. While upsetting the collegiality that infests NDHQ is not a bad idea in itself, he drew the wrong sort of attention in widely circulating a memo declaring that Canada has no need for “blue sky” Air Forces or a “blue water” Navy, and that CF transformation can only proceed by focusing on the regeneration of the Army. Others have observed, with arguably equal legitimacy, that desperate

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If You're REALLY Serious About Army Transformation...

By Nic Boisvert

Minister of National Defence John McCallum and Chief of the Land Staff General Rick Hillier cannot really be as serious about Army transformation as they claim. They clearly have not thought through all of its ramifications. The acquisition of the Stryker Mobile Gun System is going to change Canada's Army beyond all recognition, but not as they suggest. We already have a Navy that cannot project power ashore and an Air Force with very limited reach. We soon will have an Army that cannot fight wars.

Getting Stryker is in itself probably not a bad idea. Sure, the armour is too light to withstand an attack by rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs, the weapon-of-choice of most guerrilla and terrorist groups it is likely to be fielded against), it really doesn't fit in the back of a Hercules air transport without significant "modifications" (ie, taking off the gun, to be shipped in another aircraft), and it's no good off roads (without tracks, the weight makes it sink into anything soft). But a gun that size probably can bring stability to very particular circumstances. Moreover, the vehicle is made in Canada and is being acquired also by US forces (although as an adjunct to, not a replacement for, their main battle tanks), so there are industrial offsets and economies of scale to be obtained. And Canadian politicians like to do defence on the cheap. If they – or more accurately, the wonks who advise them – have decided that Canada is out of the tank business, why should the Army fight the system? Better a Stryker in hand than no direct fire support in the nest.

No, the biggest problem with Stryker is that it is a leap down a slippery slope we are unlikely to re-scale, in unfortunate Canadian tradition, without suffering too many unnecessary casualties. General Hillier says the Stryker will never be employed in situations that would demand a proper tank. Just as previous generals said the Iltis would never be driven down potentially mined roads, and the Cougar

training vehicle would never be deployed outside Canada (they became a staple in the Balkans). The Canadian Army has become accustomed to making do with what they have. It is only too predictable that some day soon after it is acquired, someone will look at that big beautiful gun on a semi-armoured chassis and say, "Kind of looks like a tank, maybe we should try it over here...". Fuzziness like that gets people killed. By then, the Canadian Army will have lost its recognized skill in armoured warfare, and even if there is a rush to re-acquire a main battle tank we will have much to re-learn and no time to do it in properly.

More problematic is that this decision will reduce, not increase, Canada's flexibility in determining overseas missions. It accepts engagement only in lower level conflict. A lesser capability such as Stryker fits nicely with American military thinking that the US "kicks down doors", leaving the Coalition to clean up after. Maybe Canadian politicians are happier not having to decide whether to fight wars. But the janitor doesn't get to choose how the mess gets made. Nor can one always predict what the mess will entail – shirking war fighting in Iraq did not reduce our costs in bringing stability to Afghanistan. And since liberal democracies cannot afford to let the Americans fail in Iraq, we may still end up there.

But transformation is more than new equipment – it's a new way of doing business. This may prove the catalyst the Army has needed to get on with organizational reform. It is not just the tanks that were too heavy to move, rather its whole formation is too cumbersome to deploy with any rapidity. The key to stability operations is to get there fast, with a great weight of forces, and there is always a requirement for more infantry. At present, too many "non-maneuvered" units in the Canadian Army rarely deploy abroad, leaving the burden of recent operations to a small proportion of the Army ranks. If you begin to blur the lines among the traditional combat arms, why not go all the way and adopt the Marine Corps model? But that also opens

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Richard Hyde

Richard 'Dick' Hyde, one of only three English-speaking Quebecers since confederation to sit as speaker of the Quebec legislature, died July 15 in Kanata, Ont. after a fall. He was 90.

Hyde represented Westmount-St. George in the Quebec legislature for 15 years during the 1950s and '60s, served as provincial minister of revenue during the Jean Lesage administration, then was appointed a Quebec provincial court judge in 1971, a position he held for 11 years.

"He was a very quiet, reserved person, but completely trustworthy" Eric Kierans, who sat with Hyde in the cabinet, told *The Gazette*.

"There wasn't a mean element in him. He was ideal as a speaker -absolutely impartial. There was no better representative of the English community in the House at that time."

John Richard Hyde was born in Westmount on Nov 15, 1912. His father was G. Gordon Hyde, a prominent lawyer who became the first Liberal to represent Westmount in the Quebec legislature when he was elected in 1939 as a member of the short-lived Adélard Godbout administration. In 1942 Godbout named him to the legislative council Quebec's Upper House, which was abolished in 1969.

Richard Hyde was educated at Westmount High School then was sent to the Royal Military College in Kingston, where he graduated in 1934 as a commissioned officer.

He then went to Cambridge University for a year before he enrolled in law at the Université de Montréal. He obtained his law degree in 1938 and went to work for his father's commercial law firm, Hyde & Ahern.

During the Second World War, Hyde served in France and Belgium with the Royal Canadian Artillery. His brother, George, was killed in action in 1941. Richard Hyde was named commander of the third Canadian Division, Royal Canadian Artillery Reserve Army in

1950 and was promoted to the rank of full colonel. He was made brigadier two years later.

Serious, restrained and bespectacled, Hyde was first elected to the Quebec provincial legislature, as it was then called, in a 1955 by-election as the Liberal member for Westmount-St. George. He kept the seat in the general election the following year, and was re-elected three times.

He married Patricia Irvine, a nurse from Toronto, in 1956. They had a son and three daughters.

In 1962, Hyde was named speaker of the 27th session of the legislature, a position today known as president of the Quebec National Assembly. As speaker, Hyde permitted tape recorders in the legislature so Hansard could report debates more efficiently.

He clashed frequently with Daniel Johnson, then leader of the opposition, who complained that Hyde's French wasn't good enough for him to be speaker. In 1965, Lesage named Hyde as his minister of revenue, replacing Eric Kierans. His toughest job, however, was to defend the government takeover of Hydro-Québec to his Westmount constituents. "Maybe we go too far in adopting nationalization," he admitted in an interview. "But we do so only after serious study and in the interests of all the people."

Hyde's campaign manager, John J. Pepper, said elections in the 1950s weren't the same as they are today.

"Candidates were highly respectable guys who deserved the job, and didn't politic for it. Dick didn't ask for the job, he didn't especially like it, but he did what he had to do. He served because he inherited the job. He was asked to run because his father had been an MLA."

Pepper said Hyde wasn't gregarious or outgoing on the campaign trail, but had a close circle of friends.

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People in the News



Jonathan Larocque recevant sa promotion
de Lt du Lcol Normand Bernier



Les adjuc anciens et nouveaux du régt :
Adjuc C. Léger; Adjuc R. Calille;
CWO J. Cosak; Adjuc G. Aubé
vous êtes bien mieux de marcher droit!!



Le Commandant serre la main du nouveau
SMR du Régiment Adjuc R. Calille



Des membres du rgt : Cpl P. Picard;
Pt R. Kaddah; BDR Gauthier;
Cpl M. Archambeault; BDR R. Martin;
BC P. Chamoun et derrière l'adj R. Hotte

Des photos de la dernière parade:

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address the Regiment. A summary of the speech is included as an insert in Sheldrake.

All in all the association is continuing to create a link between the former membership and the serving personnel. Please pass on this message to former members that you know and have them join us.

Ubique.

(Carrier continued from page 2)

Much of the current flexibility would be lost, even if traded for presumably a different kind of flexibility.

That opens the question of interoperability with others. Even a single carrier generally would have to combine with other forces to be militarily relevant. Exercising power projection with the US Marines would be a significant leap for Canada, not only in capability but also in strategic purpose. But what are the alternatives? Do we want to re-embark on notions of British imperial squadrons, even in Commonwealth guise, to reassert stability in the Sierra Leones of the world? One shudders to think of the many more Côtés d'Ivoires of La Francophonie.

These concerns and more can all be answered, and probably to positive effect. But they must be considered as part of fully informed foreign and defence policy reviews. A bigger structure brings bigger capability, but it also comes at bigger budgetary and diplomatic costs. The big-ticket carrier option must have a purpose. And that must be more than some mythological quest for the holy grail of jointness.

(Nic Boisvert is a former public servant with an interest in defence. He writes on behalf of the Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century. Free use may be made of this piece so long as reference is made to CCS21 and its Web site – www.ccs21.org.) July 7, 2003

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"People who didn't know him never knew that in private he had a fantastic sense of humour. He cracked jokes that left us in tears laughing," Pepper said.

Former MNA Richard Holden, who ran against Hyde as an independent candidate opposed to the nationalization of Hydro Québec in 1962, remembered him as modest and conscientious. "He served his constituents very well. He was reserved, and he was typical of another era when politicians were gentlemen. They managed things quietly and didn't insult each other."

Hyde's son, Michael, said his father didn't resemble the stereotypical politician.

"He was born into privilege at a time when public service went with that privilege. He took that very seriously," Michael Hyde said, "He didn't seem to think there was anything remarkable about what he accomplished. He wasn't being modest or humble. He just did what was expected of him. He did what he thought was his duty."

Hyde was named a provincial court judge in 1971 and retired from the bench in 1982.

**The Artillery Association
of Montreal needs to increase
it's membership.**

**Word of mouth is the
best form of advertising.**

**Invite a friend or an
acquaintance to join this
association and enjoy the
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the hoary box of Militia reform – if you do away with inter-arm distinctions, what happens to all of those regimental affiliations? The map of experience reads, “there be political dragons there.”

Still, the logic of transformation demands much more. The Marines have integrated air and naval forces, suggesting possibilities for Canadian amphibious “carriers”, with attendant Joint Strike Fighters and Osprey aircraft, and naval land-attack weapons. The tactical-level ISTAR battlefield surveillance system demands an operational-level interoperability with the Navy’s existing web-based command and control network....

Whoah! Suddenly, Army transformation isn’t very easy. But that doesn’t matter if you were never really serious about it in the first place. For the Army, it looks like the same old, same old, with less.

(Nic Boisvert is a former public servant with an interest in defence. He writes on behalf of the Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century. Free use may be made of this piece so long as reference is made to CCS21 and its Web site – www.ccs21.org.) November 3, 2003

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urgency attends several Air Force fleet replacement projects and that there is some merit in concentrating scarce resources on a Navy of proven success.

The bigger problem is that his “green grass” Army remains a poor man’s version of the manoeuvre-lite model the US is finding impracticable for the stabilization of Iraq. He also missed the point that US Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld has decided that the USN/USMC model is the one for future US forces: Rumsfeld is in the process of “transforming” the US Army, and when he is done will turn his sights on the USAF.

Recognizing that CF transformation will include interoperability with US forces, these points must not be lost on Canadians. Nor should the fact that all three services fill different needs. True, Army “boots on the ground” speak to a nation’s commitment. But in the days after 9-11, the need to station Combat Air Patrols over Canadian airways proved the Air Force’s continuing need for manned fighters. And as the focal point for a multinational task force, the Navy has materially aided the preservation of a broad based Coalition in the War Against Terrorism. All this means the Navy and Air Force must accept that they have a role in supporting ground operations. The Army must learn to accept that support. All three will look different in the end. And that end will probably include the Amphibious Support Ship that is needed to make something practical out of the Chretien Doctrine.

St Barbara’s dinner

2 Fd is hosting the St Barbara dinner this year. The dinner will be held at the Officer’s Mess, Caserne Cote-des-Neiges, on December 12 at 1900 (for 2000).

Mess Kit (with medals) for serving officers.
 Black Tie for retired officers.

All Quebec based Artillery units will be represented. Much pleasure is anticipated.