

Sheldrake's Log

Montreal Gunners Newsletter



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Sheldrake's Log

Some significant entries to this log in the last months.

HONOURED

In extenso from the files of the Governor General

Lieutenant-Colonel David Anthony Patterson, M.S.M., C.D. Kingston and Wolfe Island, Ontario Meritorious Service Medal (Military Division)

Lieutenant-Colonel Patterson was deployed to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in 2006, as the strategic plans advisor to the Darfur Integrated Task Force. During a period of volatile activity and uncertainty, he was instrumental in creating a multi-national transition planning team charged with the creation of contingency plans for the African Union Forces. His expertise, his oversight and his vision were key to enabling the creation of the United Nations' phased support packages, which have since formed the cornerstone for all transition planning within the Integrated Task Force. Lieutenant-Colonel Patterson's outstanding leadership and dedication brought great honour to the Canadian Forces and to Canada.

Le lieutenant-colonel David Anthony Patterson, M.S.M., C.D. Kingston et Wolfe Island (Ontario) Médaille du service méritoire (division militaire)

Le lieutenant-colonel Patterson a été déployé à Addis Abeba, en Éthiopie, en 2006, en tant que conseiller pour les plans stratégiques auprès de la Force opérationnelle intégrée au Darfour. Durant une période marquée par la volatilité et l'incertitude, il a aidé à former une équipe de transition multinationale chargée de créer des

plans de contingence pour les Forces de l'Union africaine. Grâce à son expertise, à ses qualités de superviseur et à sa vision, il a facilité la création des trousseaux d'appui progressif des Nations Unies, qui forment, depuis ce temps, la pierre angulaire de toutes les planifications de transition au sein de la Force intégrée. En manifestant un leadership et un dévouement hors du commun, le lieutenant-colonel Patterson a fait grand honneur aux Forces canadiennes et au Canada.

For the record, Dave is a former CO of 2 FD. The Montreal Gunner family congratulates Lieutenant-Colonel Paterson for a job exceptionally well done.

IN BATTLE

Le 22 août 2007 à 7h00, lors de manœuvres de combat en Afghanistan, la Batterie X du 5 RALC (renforcée de plusieurs artilleurs réservistes du SQFT (Secteur Québec Force Terrestre) a engagé l'ennemi avec grand succès. Cette mission est historique étant la

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A Word from the President/Le Mot du Président

Fellow Montreal Gunners,

Another year is starting at the Association and I trust that you and your families enjoyed a restful and satisfying down time during the summer months.

The Association since we last communicated with you was busy wrapping up the activities of the year 2006/2007. First we had the Association's AGM on the 24th of April 2007 and then at the invitation of the Regiment participated at the Spring Mess Dinner on Friday the 18th of May 2007. The season finale was the inspection of three Cadets corps by the Colonel Commandant, Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery, MGen John Archibald MacInnis.

After the review it was announced and graciously accepted by the Col Cmdt that starting next year an award in his name would be given to a cadet selected as the cadet who best displayed combined proficiency in academic studies and military training.

After a well deserved rest during July and August, the Association was back at work with the First Friday of the month luncheon on Friday the 7th of September which was organized on the spur of the moment by popular demand, our members being anxious to renew this activity ASAP coming off the summer lay off.

During the period of Sept 12th to the 16th, Col Saint-Louis and myself attended the annual AGM meeting of Royal Canadian Artillery Association in Brandon/ Shilo, Manitoba. The Montreal association played a major role at the meeting with presentations by Col Saint-Louis as chairman of the membership committee and by myself as the chairman of the new Fund generating committee. Recommendations which had been formulated and approved at our own AGM in April 2007 on membership fees and communications. These were innovative formulas for the RCAA that are designed to increase membership and facilitate communications at the national level and were extremely well received by the national members and adopted unanimously.

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Mes amis artilleurs de Montréal,

Nous voici au début d'une autre année. J'espère que vous vous êtes bien reposés, vous et votre famille, durant la période d'été.

Depuis notre dernière communication, l'Association a été occupée à compléter le calendrier 2006-2007.

Premièrement, il y a eu l'assemblée générale annuelle le 24 avril 2007 et, sur invitation du 2^e Régiment, nous avons assisté au Dîner régimentaire du printemps le vendredi 18 mai 2007.

La finale de la saison a été la revue des corps de cadets par le colonel commandant du Régiment royal de l'Artillerie canadienne, le major-général John Archibald MacInnis. À la suite de la revue, avec la bienveillante acceptation du col cmdt, nous avons annoncé qu'un prix portant son nom serait décerné, dès la prochaine année d'entraînement, à un cadet ayant démontré l'excellence à la fois dans les domaines académique et militaire.

Après un repos bien mérité en juillet et août, l'Association a repris le boulot d'abord avec les Déjeuners du premier vendredi. Bien que le premier déjeuner ait été prévu pour octobre, nous en avons organisé un le vendredi 7 septembre de toute urgence à la demande populaire, les convives habituels désirant renouer le plus tôt avec cette activité dès la fin de l'été.

Durant la période du 12 au 16 septembre, le col Saint-Louis et moi-même avons participé à l'Assemblée générale annuelle de l'Association de l'Artillerie royale canadienne à Brandon/ Shilo, Manitoba. L'Association de l'Artillerie de Montréal y a joué un rôle majeur, entre autre, par la présentation du président du comité national des cotisations, le col Saint-Louis, et par moi à titre de président du nouveau comité de sollicitation de fonds. Les recommandations qui avaient été formulées et approuvées à notre assemblée générale annuelle relativement à la double cotisation et au réseau de communication y ont été présentées. Il s'agissait, pour l'AARC, de concepts innovateurs, ayant pour but

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A Word from the President (cont'd)

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Also fund generating projects were proposed that were also approved by the assembly.

It was proposed and approved that the next AGM meeting will be held in Québec City from the 11th to the 14th of Sept 2008 in commemoration of the City's 400th anniversary. Every gunner in the province is invited to participate in the event. More detailed information will be made available to you in due time.

We were privileged to tour the Artillery Museum in Shilo and I would like to state that no words can describe the level of professionalism that the museum represents and we can be proud of our artillery heritage presented there because in my opinion it is a museum second to none in the sphere of any military museum in Canada. I invite every gunner in Canada who has not seen this museum to make an effort to visit this gem of a museum sometime in their lifetime. You won't be disappointed, believe me.

The second part of the AGM aside from usual association business was a presentation and discussion on the operations of the RCA in Afghanistan by Maj Dan Bobbitt who had just returned as battery commander. The general overview from the theatre of action is that the Artillery has regained its influence and respect from the combat troops as the most rapid and accurate fire power in combat. The infantry from all countries have nothing but praise for the "guns" and is relied on more than air power for ground support. Our battery with their new 777 guns is the darling of the infantry beloved by all. Gentlemen in Afghanistan the artillery is showing why they belong at the "right of the line".

At the closing mess dinner in the Shilo Artillery Officers' Mess we witnessed the handing over of Colonel Commandant's duties between MGen J.A MacInnis and BGen E. Beno.

As you can see the table is set for another banner year for us and the Regiment at large and your Association will be front and forward to mark this special year that will be culminated with the big event in September

2008 in Québec City.

Ubique

Maj (ret) Donald Dussault

Le Mot du Président (suite)

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l'augmentation des cotisants et la facilitation des communications au niveau national ; elles ont été extrêmement bien reçues au national et adoptées unanimement. Aussi, les projets de campagne de souscription proposés ont été approuvés par l'assemblée.

L'assemblée a approuvé que la prochaine AGA soit tenue à Québec du 11 au 14 septembre 2008 dans le cadre des Fêtes du 400^e de la fondation de Québec. Tous les artilleurs de la province y sont invités. Les informations pertinentes seront communiquées dès que disponibles.

Nous avons eu le privilège de visiter le Musée de l'Artillerie de Shilo et je voudrais vous dire qu'il n'y a pas de mot pour décrire le professionnalisme qui s'en dégage. Nous pouvons être fiers de l'héritage de l'artillerie y présenté, parce qu'à mon avis c'est un musée de première qualité dans le domaine des musées militaires canadiens. J'invite tous les artilleurs canadiens qui n'ont pas vu ce musée de faire un effort de visiter ce joyau de musée une fois durant leur vivant. Vous ne serez pas déçus. Croyez-moi.

La deuxième partie de l'AGA en plus des affaires usuelles de l'Association fut la présentation et la discussion sur les opérations de l'ARC en Afghanistan par le maj. Dan Bobbitt, qui y revenait tout juste, après avoir commandé la batterie en action. L'aperçu général du théâtre des opérations est que l'Artillerie a regagné son influence et le respect des troupes de combat comme la puissance de feu la plus rapide et la plus précise. L'infanterie de tous les pays n'a rien d'autre que des louanges pour les « canons » et dépend davantage sur eux que la puissance de feu aérienne pour un appui au sol. Notre batterie avec ses nouveaux canons 777 est la chérie de l'infanterie et aimée de tous. Messieurs, en Afghanistan, l'Artillerie

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Sheldrake's Log (cont'd)

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première mission de combat des artilleurs du SQFT. Il faut remonter à la guerre de Corée pour retrouver des missions de combat de cette nature. L'article ci-joint présentent les détails de la mission.

IN MÉMORIAM

Nous vous faisons part avec grand regret du décès du Major René Potier dans la nuit du 7 novembre. René était à la retraite depuis plusieurs années et visitait régulièrement ses camarades du 2 Field et du 2 Medium. Nous offrons nos plus sincères condoléances aux proches de René.

IN RECOVERY

The week of November 5th will be long remembered by the 2 FD Gunners. It was not a good one. In addition to the untimely death of Major Potier, Colonel Gilbert Saint-Louis suffered a stroke on November 8th. Gilbert is recovering at Hopital Cité de la santé in Laval. Physiotherapy treatment has started and we all hope for a full recovery.

IN MÉMORIAM

C'est avec tristesse que nous avons appris le décès du Très honorable Antonio Lamer le 24 novembre à Ottawa. Le Colonel Lamer a été le Colonel Honoraire du 2^e Régiment d'artillerie de campagne de 2000 à 2004. De plus il a été Lieutenant colonel Honoraire du 62^e Régiment d'artillerie de campagne de 1992 à 1995.

Your Observer

Sheldrake

Warning Order

The Annual General Meeting of the RCAA will be held in Quebec City from September 11 to 14, 2008, to coincide with the 40th anniversary of the founding of 5 RALC and the 400th anniversary of the founding of Quebec City.

The next issue of Sheldrake's Log will contain more information on the activities celebrating the 40th anniversary of 5 RALC and the AGM of the RCAA.

Une première historique pour la batterie X et le 5 RALC

Journal Adsum

Par le capitaine BJG Bossé G12

En ce matin du 22 août 2007, nous sommes partis anxieux mais néanmoins prêts pour n'importe quoi. Tout l'équipage de G12 savait que cette journée serait longue et exigeante pour tous. En effet, l'équipe de combat B se lançait à l'assaut de Ghundey Ghar, point stratégique important du district de Zharey dans la province de Kandahar.

Nous avons donc quitté la base de patrouille Wilson à 6 h en direction ouest pour prendre position pour l'avance sur la montagne de Ghundey Ghar.

L'équipe de combat B avait choisi de faire son avance de l'ouest vers l'est pour faire face à l'ennemi au lieu de faire une avance nord-sud sur la montagne qui risquait d'exposer ses flancs. Nous nous trouvions donc au sein de la première colonne de cette mission d'envergure qui regroupait un grand nombre de véhicules, allant des chars Léopard C2 au VLLR qui transportait le ravitaillement nécessaire à l'occupation de la montagne par le groupement tactique.



Quelques membres de l'équipe du poste de commandement de la troupe C en train de calculer les données de tirs.

Vers 7 h, la première colonne se mit en marche, précédée des chars qui ouvraient la

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marche et assuraient notre liberté de mouvement contre les mines et possibles dispositifs explosifs de circonstance (DEC) le long de notre parcours.

Pour prendre position sur notre axe d'avance principal, l'équipe de combat B devait descendre d'environ deux kilomètres vers le sud avant d'effectuer son mouvement tournant vers l'est pour lancer sa marche proprement dite sur l'objectif.

C'est lors de ce premier mouvement que nous avons fait face à nos premiers contacts de la journée. Des obus de mortier ont commencé à tomber près de notre colonne puis des rafales d'armes légères ont été entendues, suivies de quelques coups de RPG-7.

Dès les premiers contacts, les chars ont répliqué avec vigueur suivis des VBL III de la compagnie B. Durant près d'une heure, notre avance vers le sud s'est faite sous les tirs sporadiques de l'ennemi avant que l'on crée un écran fumigène permettant à l'équipe de combat d'effectuer son mouvement tournant et de se préparer à avancer sur l'ennemi d'ouest en est.

Pour se rendre sur l'objectif, l'équipe de combat B devait nettoyer une série d'habitations s'étirant sur près de deux kilomètres le long de l'axe d'avance. Pour ce

faire, des pelotons de la compagnie B, appuyés d'un peloton de l'Armée nationale afghane, ont effectué une avance démontée le long de l'axe d'avance avec les chars et les VBL III en appui rapproché. Ce fut une avance méthodique et fastidieuse mais qui s'est révélée efficace.

De notre côté, nous avons effectué des missions de tirs fumigènes le long de l'axe d'avance pour dissuader l'ennemi et le faire reculer. De plus, peu avant midi, nous avons appuyé l'avance par une démonstration de force convaincante menée par des avions de chasse américains.

L'avance se déroulait sans encombre jusqu'à ce que nous arrivions à quelques centaines de mètres de l'objectif, là où l'ennemi a commencé à engager violemment nos éléments avancés. C'est à ce moment que nous sommes intervenus. Lors de la demande de tir, nous avons dépassé quelques véhicules pour nous déplacer plus en tête de colonne et être en mesure de mieux corriger le tir.

À notre arrivée, nous ne pouvions discerner la cible sur le terrain : nous avons donc demandé une désignation de cible par traceuses à un des VBL III de tête. Les belligérants se trouvaient près d'une enceinte, à environ 300 mètres des troupes amies. Une fois la cible désignée, nous avons dirigé le tir sur la cible, jusqu'au tir d'efficacité. Les obus sont tombés directement sur la cible et ont été d'une efficacité remarquable.

Nous pensions bien que notre travail était terminé et que cela serait tout pour la journée, lorsque de nouveaux coups de feu et de RPG se sont fait entendre à notre gauche, à environ 200 mètres des troupes. Une nouvelle mission de tir nous a été confiée.

Cette fois, nous étions directement face à l'objectif. En nous servant d'une cible préenregistrée tout près de la cible, nous avons commencé à ajuster le tir. Encore une fois, nous étions dans une situation de danger rapproché.

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Un des détachements de la troupe C engage une cible le 22 août 2007. - Photo : Adj JAA Picard

Claude Michaud nommé SMR du 2^e Régiment d'artillerie de campagne



L'Adjudant-chef Claude Michaud est né à Montréal.

À l'hiver 1973, le goût de l'aventure l'incite à s'enrôler dans les Forces Canadiennes au sein du Régiment d'Artillerie Royal Canadien. Sa carrière militaire débute à l'École de Recrues des Forces Canadiennes à Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu et, en avril 1973, il se rend à la Base des Forces Canadiennes (BFC) Valcartier afin d'apprendre les rudiments de l'Artillerie.

En mai 1973, il se joint au 5^e Régiment d'Artillerie Légère du Canada, où il assume différentes fonctions dont celles de membre de la Batterie X. En avril 1975, il se rend à Chypre avec le 2^e Bataillon R22eR afin de prendre part, sous l'égide de l'Organisation des Nations Unies (ONU), à sa toute première opération.

De retour au Canada, il est promu Bombardier et travail au COGO de Montréal et est muté à la 129^e Batterie à Lahr en Allemagne de 1976 à 1980 où il est promu Bombardier-Chef en 1979. De retour au Canada, il se joint à l'École de Recrues des Forces Canadiennes en juillet 1980. Au mois d'avril 1981, il obtient sa

promotion au grade de Sergent et travaille comme commandant de PON Recrues, et en 1982 il devient papa d'une fillette et ensuite a suivi le cours prestigieux de Drill au Guards' Depot à Pirbright en Angleterre. Il est à nouveau muté en 1983 et est choisi par LCol R. Dallaire au sein du 5^e Régiment d'Artillerie Légère du Canada où il assume les fonctions d'adjoint de Troupe des Opérations et Adj. du PC Batterie V à Valcartier.

Il est muté à l'École d'Artillerie Gagetown au Nouveau Brunswick et est promu au grade d'Adjudant en juin 1984. Il participe à un cours et différentes tâches d'AIG, et est ensuite muté à la 119^e Batterie Miramichi de 1986 – 1988 au Nouveau Brunswick.

De retour en Allemagne en 1988, il est promu au grade d'Adjudant-maître en juillet 1989. La majeure partie de son affectation se déroule dans la province de Bade au sein du 4 AD Régiment, RCA.

Il est de retour à la BFC Chatham au Nouveau Brunswick en juillet 1992 et occupe le poste d'Adjudant-maître de la Troupe Tactiques de l'École d'Artillerie et deux ans plus tard, il obtient le poste de Home Station (RHQ RCA SM) Sergent-major du QG, à la maison-mère de l'ARC à Shilo, au Manitoba.

En juin 1997, alors qu'il est muté en Ontario, il réalise ses ambitions et devient (DSM) Sergent-major de Drill au CMR du Canada, Kingston.

Il est de retour à l'École d'Artillerie Gagetown au Nouveau Brunswick de 2000- 2004 comme SMB Tactiques & Doctrines. De retour à ÉLRFC en 2004, il assume les fonctions de Sergent-major de Division Soutien jusqu'à juillet 2006 et prend sa retraite et est transféré à la Première réserve au 2^e Régiment de campagne, ARC à Montréal.

Dès lors, il assume les tâches de Sergent-major de Batterie 50^e et 7^e et le 16 septembre 2007 lors du Droit de Cité à Terrebonne, est nommé Sergent-major régimentaire.

L'Adjudant-chef Claude Michaud a été promu Adjudant-chef le 13 octobre et est marié à Silvia Kirn, une européenne, et ils ont une fille, Dorothee.

Une première historique pour la batterie X et le 5 RALC (suite)

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Après une légère correction, nous avons demandé le tir de proximité sur cette cible et avons exigé que toutes les troupes démontées se tiennent à couvert étant donné les risques de pertes collatérales. Les obus ont fait leur travail et les membres de la compagnie B ont eu droit à une bonne dose d'adrénaline.

Après ces deux engagements effectués par les membres de la batterie X, l'avance a pu continuer jusqu'à la montagne sans encombre. Nous avons néanmoins effectué deux autres missions fumigènes pour couvrir le reste de l'avance.

Cette journée du 22 août 2007 restera à jamais marquée dans les annales de la batterie X et du 5^e Régiment d'artillerie légère du Canada comme la première fois où le régiment a participé à une mission de combat où ses canons ont été employés contre l'ennemi.

Par contre, pour les membres de G12, cette journée signifiera également la journée où ils ont fait face directement à la mort de deux de leurs collègues de l'équipe de combat B qui ont péri sur un DEC à la toute fin de l'opération. Cette journée restera donc pour nous une journée mémorable mais tragique.



MWO Jack Moloughney, BSM 7th Battery, who is currently on duty in Afghanistan, sitting on top of a Command Post vehicle.

Let rebuilders tell the story

Canadians would be proud of what's done in their name in Afghanistan – if they really knew

Posted By Michael Den Tandt

KANDAHAR — The Afghan war is not one conflict but three: a guerrilla war, a development war and a communications war. Canada is gaining ground in the first and slowly winning the second.

We're losing the third.

The military and the media deserve some measure of blame for this. Mainly though, responsibility falls to Prime Minister Stephen Harper. Even as he struggles to sell the Afghan mission to an increasingly uneasy public, his mania for control is stifling the truth about what's really happening here.

The tragedy is that this truth is extraordinary. It's a story of courage and grit and idealism that, if more Canadians only knew it, would make them very proud. But most don't know it, because the people best positioned to tell it have been gagged.

I came back to Afghanistan to find answers to two questions. Is Canada's deployment here still worthwhile, despite the rising toll in lives? And if it is, then why do so many people back home think it isn't?

In the past week I've spoken to dozens of Canadian soldiers, non-governmental aid workers and Afghans, including some who are very critical of the U.S.-led international effort here and of the Karzai regime. Their message was unanimous: Please, Canada, don't go.

Our country has an influence and a reputation here that are vastly disproportionate to the number of troops we have on the ground.

That's partly because we are spending money — a great deal of money, \$1.2 billion committed over 10 years — on rebuilding and redevelopment.

Your tax dollars are helping pay for a vast national demining project, led by Canada but in partnership with the United Nations. Every

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Droit de Cité à Terrebonne et la MRC des Moulins!

Le 16 septembre 2007 a été une journée mémorable pour le 2^e Régiment d'Artillerie de Campagne, Artillerie Royale Canadienne. Le 2^e Régiment a eu l'honneur de recevoir le Droit de Cité de la part de la Ville de Terrebonne et la MRC des Moulins.

Le Droit de Cité est une tradition qui remonte à l'histoire militaire de la Grande-Bretagne. Dans le passé, les villes britanniques s'opposaient à l'idée d'armées régulières permanentes. Elles ne voulaient pas voir les soldats défilé dans les rues, car cela donnait l'apparence de guerre, troublait la paix et nuisait à leurs droits civiques anciens. Par conséquent, toute unité militaire qui voulait entrer dans l'enceinte d'une ville devait d'abord demander la permission au lord-maire. La permission n'était accordée que si le lord-maire était convaincu de la bonne conduite des soldats et connaissait le but de la présence de l'unité dans la ville.

En accordant le Droit de Cité, une ville donne à une unité militaire la permission de défilé dans ses rues tambours battants, drapeaux déployés et baïonnettes aux canons. Le Droit de Cité est l'un des honneurs les plus convoités que des autorités municipales peuvent conférer à une unité militaire. Il s'agit en fait d'une marque d'affection et d'estime que des citoyens d'une ville rendent à une unité militaire. Une fois acquis, ce privilège demeure valide ad vitam aeternam (vie éternelle).

Depuis septembre 2006, les Unités du 34^e GBC ont reçu un nouveau mandat, soit d'établir des liaisons militaires et civiles dans le cadre d'appui aux Opérations Domestiques. Ce mandat vise à informer les organismes municipaux de mesures d'urgences et de sécurité publique comment les FC viendront en aide au cas où une situation grave forcerait une demande d'appui au Gouvernement Fédéral.

La ville de Terrebonne et la MRC des Moulins sont dans la zone de responsabilité du 2^e Régiment de Campagne de l'Artillerie Royale Canadienne. L'honneur d'obtenir le Droit de Cité a été accordé à l'unité comme geste

symbolique de ce nouveau rapport entre l'unité, la ville de Terrebonne et la MRC des Moulins.

Durant cette journée inoubliable étaient présent : le Colonel Lachance, Commandant de la 34^e Brigade, le Lieutenant-Colonel (Hon) Fecteau, le Lieutenant-Colonel Michel Bourque Commandant du 2^e Régiment de Campagne de l'Artillerie Royale Canadienne, le maire de la ville de Terrebonne, Monsieur Jean-Marc Robitaille, des membres du conseil municipal de Terrebonne, les membres du 2^e Régiment de Campagne de l'Artillerie Royale Canadienne, les membres de la musique du 62^{ème} régiment d'artillerie de campagne de Shawinigan et les citoyens de la Ville de Terrebonne.

C'est avec grande joie que les citoyens de Terrebonne ont vu défilé les membres du 2^e



Le LCol Bourque et le maire de Terrebonne, Monsieur Jean-Marc Robitaille

Régiment d'artillerie de Campagne, Artillerie Royale Canadienne dans les rues. Les membres du 2^e Régiment ont suivi un trajet pour se rendre sur l'île des moulins. Le 2^e régiment comprend la 7^e batterie, l'élément de mission du Régiment, et la 50^e batterie regroupant les éléments

de soutien de support. La musique du 62^e Régiment d'Artillerie de Campagne de Shawinigan a été très appréciée tout au long

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des cérémonies. Après le défilé, la musique du 34^e GBC a offert un spectacle amusant à l'île du Moulin aux citoyens.

Durant cette belle occasion, le 2^e Régiment de Campagne de l'Artillerie Royale Canadienne a procédé avec une cérémonie de changement de sergent-major régimentaire et à un déploiement des canons. L'Adjuc Réjean Calille, SMR sortant, a échangé ses responsabilités avec l'Adjum Claude Michaud, SMR entrant. De plus, le commandant du 2^e Régiment, le Lcol Michel Bourque a pris le temps de remettre des décorations et des promotions aux membres du 2^e Régiment de Campagne de l'Artillerie Royale Canadienne.



La cérémonie de changement de sergent-major régimentaire entre L'Adjuc Réjean Calille, SMR sortant, et l'Adjum Claude Michaud, SMR entrant.

À la fin de cette journée historique, le LCol Bourque et le maire de Terrebonne, Monsieur Jean-Marc Robitaille ont remerciés tous les gens présents pour avoir partagé ensemble la célébration protocolaire du Droit de Cité et en soulignant l'importance d'assurer une coordination des efforts en matière d'aide aux autorités civiles. De plus, les allocutions ont permis de souligner les efforts des membres du 2^e Régiment présentement en opérations avec la FO 03-07.

Let rebuilders tell the story (cont'd)

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day on a mountain-top in Kabul, Afghans, mentored by Canadians, carry on the painstaking and dangerous work of removing and destroying the thousands of pieces of unexploded ordnance that litter this country. Canada's Department of Foreign affairs is the single largest donor, contributing \$20 million annually.

Your tax dollars are paying for a project that, this year alone, will help 3,000 war widows in Kabul start microbusinesses. In many cases, the aid begins with a single cow or goat, which allows a mother to feed her kids.

Your tax dollars are paying for the training of a professional Afghan National Army, which is increasingly imposing order in the volatile south. Thirty-four thousand troops are already trained. A thousand new troops a month are graduating from the Afghan National Training Centre in Kabul. Canadian soldiers are in the forefront of the training effort, in Kabul and in the south.

Your tax dollars are paying for 200 small aid projects in Kandahar City, all geared toward stimulating local business and trades and developing a functioning local economy.

These efforts are not being carried out on your behalf at arms' length. They're being led, supported and protected by a Canadian military that has learned, through half a century of peacekeeping, how to properly and modestly engage with a foreign culture.

You may have heard that, around the world, no one can tell Canadians and Americans apart any longer. That is false. In Afghanistan, everyone knows the difference. Canadians are leaders here in the delicate trick of combining military power with aid. Other nations in the 37-member international coalition come to our Provincial Reconstruction Team base in Kandahar City to study our methods.

The PRT, Camp Nathan Smith, is a model, an experiment in a new kind of military engagement. The former Liberal government called it the "three-d" approach — defense,

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Let rebuilders tell the story (cont'd)

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diplomacy and development. The Harper government calls it the “whole of government” approach. The two are one and the same: soldiers, working hand in hand with RCMP officers, diplomats, lawyers, doctors, specialists in governance and foreign aid workers, to help the Afghans manage their own affairs, raise their standard of living and establish a functional state.

You’ve heard about the 71 Canadian soldiers and one diplomat who’ve lost their lives in Afghanistan.

You’ve heard about the CBC journalist and cameraman whose armoured vehicle was blown up by a roadside bomb.

What you haven’t heard, perhaps, is that the vast majority of the casualties and injuries in this civil war are Afghan. There are four battalions of Afghan soldiers, numbering some 3,000 troops, operating in the south now, mentored and supported by Canadian officers. The Afghans are in the forefront of every combat operation. Eighty-five per cent of the casualties treated for war injuries at Kandahar Airfield, the main coalition base in the south, are Afghan army or Afghan police.

It follows from this that our deployment here is not an occupation: It’s a support mission. But few people back home appreciate this, because nobody’s covering the Afghan side of the war. The Afghans have no media to speak of, and the Canadian media are focused with laserlike intensity on Canadian casualties. Afghan casualties, even mass casualties, get short shrift in news meetings in Toronto, Vancouver and Montreal.

The leading edge of Canada’s humanitarian engagement in this country is the PRT, Camp Nathan Smith. But for reasons that defy explanation, only the soldiers stationed there are allowed to speak publicly about their work.

The five officials from the department of Foreign Affairs, the 10 RCMP officers engaged in training Afghan police, the head of the CIDA mission in the province (with a budget of \$39 million this year alone), are not allowed to speak to the media. They have no coherent

communication strategy. This is not their fault. It’s the government’s fault, because, according to multiple sources here, they have been gagged by the Prime Minister’s office.

Figure that one out, if you can. You have a government under fire nearly every day, based on the notion that there’s no rebuilding going on in Afghanistan. This notion is false.

Yet the very people who could best spread the word about the good works Canada is carrying out beneath the security umbrella provided by our troops are unable to talk about it. This translates into a distorted portrait of the mission back home, which then feeds more political division.

If it weren’t so thoroughly stupid and tragic, it would be comical.

The military can’t get off scot-free either. It has a mandate of public openness, which grew out of the Somalia debacle 14 years ago. Good. But the vast majority of the Canadian army’s communications resources in Kandahar Province are located at the Kandahar Airfield — the centre of combat operations.

Reporters at the airfield are supported by a satellite and media tents with sophisticated communications equipment.

At the PRT, there’s a single media tent. It has no reliable, permanent Internet hookups. There’s no satellite for television transmissions. So reporters working there have a difficult time filing stories. As a result, most choose to stay at the airfield, where they don’t hear a lot about development work, because it’s all based at the PRT.

The media? We’re at fault too. Reporters driven by competition and the demands of editors back home, are hell-bent on covering Canadians in combat. That’s a good thing, as far as it goes. Canadians need a public witness to the exercise of lethal force by their representatives abroad. Combat stories are dramatic and gripping and the tales we hear about soldiers at war can inspire and move us the way few other stories can.

But let’s face it: The entire mission stands or falls on whether development can succeed. For media organizations to ignore the tangible

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evidence of progress simply because these stories aren't as dramatic as combat, beggars belief. But the evidence here suggests this is precisely what's happening. The irony is that the military itself is supporting the journalists embedded at Kandahar Airfield.

Here's why all this matters so much: The Taliban are not fighting a conventional guerrilla war. All their efforts are geared towards forcing Western governments to pull their soldiers out of Afghanistan. So they're fighting a media war, designed to stimulate anguished coverage in Western capitals, which then creates political pressure for a pullout.

Every suicide bombing and IED attack must be seen in this light. It's about hurting Western troops, but it's even more about causing fear and uncertainty back home. This is why there's such frustration among soldiers here about the posturing and chest-beating in Ottawa each time a Canadian dies in combat. Each cluster of front-page stories is, in effect, a tactical victory for the insurgents. That's a hard truth for any journalist to swallow, but it is true nevertheless.

What happens if we pull out? Some say it would make no difference. The Americans have tens of thousands of troops and they could easily come in and replace us.

Unfortunately, it's not nearly that simple. The Afghans don't trust the Americans. Their approach is different from ours — much more blunt, less culturally sensitive. Canada has an institutional memory now in Kandahar, won by five years of hard work on the ground. Canada has the aid projects, just now beginning to bear fruit. Canada has credibility with the Afghans, won by our soldiers' willingness to fight and die on their behalf.

If we pull out in February of 2009, much of that will be lost. The mission will continue, because the United States and NATO have a strategic imperative to insure that it continues. But the setback to it will be huge and Canada's standing in Afghanistan, and around the world, will suffer immeasurably.

Can any of this be turned around, at this late date?

Possibly. But it needs to happen quickly.

If Stephen Harper hopes to sustain the Afghan mission, he must immediately and unconditionally ungag Canadian diplomats and aid workers and police officers in Kandahar City. Indeed, he should instruct them to speak out, loudly, to anyone who cares to listen.

He should ensure opposition politicians see what's being done — Liberal defence critic Denis Coderre arrived in Kandahar Monday, saying his party's position to end the combat part of the mission is not going to change — but he is not to leave the airfield base for security reasons.

But Harper should ensure Coderre can go to Kabul and stay for as long as he wants. The military should ferry him to Kandahar and leave him alone at Camp Nathan Smith for a few days to draw his own conclusions. The same goes for Liberal leader Stephane Dion, Bloc Quebecois leader Gilles Duceppe and NDP leader Jack Layton.

Let them talk to the soldiers, the aid workers, the diplomats and police officers. Let them gauge the level of commitment by the looks on soldiers' faces as they tell their stories. Most of all, let the critics talk to the Afghans themselves — people who have suffered immeasurably, and to whom our country has made a promise of friendship.

After that, Coderre and company might still come home and vote for a pullout in February of 2009. But I can't see it happening.

Michael Den Tandt is editor of the Sun Times in Owen Sound and a national affairs columnist with Osprey Media. He recently returned from an assignment in Afghanistan.

SHOOT AND STAY PUT (cont'd)

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older guns by only 2 km. The 155/52 calibre- yet to enter service even in the US or UK- increases the load of the gun carriage and the propulsion system which are required to manoeuvre it, particularly in the high mountain ranges where it could be deployed. Quite appropriately, it is symbolic of the unwieldy artillery programme.

Réponse à mon frère qui s'oppose à mon déploiement en Afghanistan

Catherine Déri, Officier logistique au sein des Forces canadiennes

Ce texte constitue une réplique à la «Lettre à ma sœur militaire qui part en Afghanistan», publiée dans Le Devoir du 15 juin dernier sous la plume de Francis Dupuis-Déri, frère du capitaine Catherine Déri.

Vendredi passé, tu as publié une lettre m'étant adressée et exposant tes arguments contre l'implication militaire canadienne en Afghanistan. Certains croiront que ta missive m'atteint personnellement ou que tu te sers de ta sœur pour «sensationaliser» ton message. Moi, je comprends que c'est plutôt la décision politique que tu remets en question sans viser les soldats directement -- quoique tu souhaiterais qu'ils prennent davantage position sur le sujet. Il t'est déjà arrivé de contester ouvertement des décisions. Par contre, celle-ci a un impact direct sur ta vie personnelle puisque moi, ta sœur, je ferai partie des 2500 militaires canadiens qui se déploieront cet été dans ce pays qui a vécu des décennies d'instabilité.

Les valeurs canadiennes

Je respecte la passion que tu démontres pour tes convictions et je t'encourage à faire plein usage du principe de liberté d'expression pour les communiquer. Cet acte démocratique est une des valeurs chéries par la population canadienne. C'est une liberté fondamentale qu'on souhaite à tous les habitants des pays où les membres des Forces canadiennes sont déployés. Nos soldats ont toujours participé à l'effort global de stabilisation et sont reconnus à travers le monde comme des militaires d'une grande compétence. Je suis fière de faire partie de cette équipe, et c'est un honneur pour moi que d'être sélectionnée pour des missions outre-mer.

Tu te demandes pourquoi je m'en vais en Afghanistan. J'y vais parce que j'y ai été invitée par les Afghans! Le Canada fournit des troupes, comme le font aussi 36 autres pays, dans le cadre d'une mission autorisée par les Nations unies. Toutes nos opérations ont lieu avec le consentement du gouvernement

afghan. Ce gouvernement, maintenant constitué d'hommes et de femmes, comporte selon moi une majorité d'individus dont les intentions sont nobles. Les personnes d'influence qui émergent des pays en guerre n'ont certes pas toujours un passé reluisant, mais nous unissons nos efforts avec les leaders en place qui désirent la même chose que nous: permettre au peuple afghan d'aspirer à un avenir meilleur.

Tu veux savoir si je suis obligée d'y aller ou si je suis volontaire. Le port de l'uniforme est un engagement à la fois professionnel et personnel, manifesté par un profond désir de participer à toute la gamme d'opérations, au pays comme à l'étranger. Ceux qui ne sont pas volontaires ont toujours l'option de choisir une autre profession que celle de militaire. Les exemples de soldats refusant de s'impliquer que tu fournis dans ton article sont tous des cas de l'armée américaine. Je ne connais aucun militaire canadien assumant des fonctions à temps plein ayant décidé de quitter l'organisation pour devenir objecteur de conscience.

Que faire pour aider l'Afghanistan?

Te souviens-tu quand nous étions tout petits? Tu jouais à conquérir le monde avec tes soldats en plastique pendant que je dessinais mes rêves sur la porte du frigo. Trente ans plus tard, je porte un uniforme militaire et tu illustres tes espoirs dans les médias. Ma profession me permet de contribuer activement à la réalisation de mes rêves et des tiens en m'impliquant pour aider les peuples en détresse. L'Afghanistan a vécu très peu de périodes d'accalmie mais regorge d'hommes, de femmes et d'enfants qui partagent les mêmes espoirs que nous. En tant que professeur de science politique, dis-moi donc comment on peut venir en aide aux pays disloqués de l'intérieur? Combien de politiciens ont songé au sort de l'Afghanistan

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et à sa valeur stratégique sans pour autant que l'avenir des Afghans ne s'améliore? Voilà ma chance, comme pour mes 7500 confrères qui m'ont précédée, de faire quelque chose de concret pour aider ces gens à fonder des bases solides en matière de sécurité, de gouverne et de développement.

Contrairement à ce que tu laisses entendre, les progrès sont palpables en Afghanistan. Parfois, on peut douter de la transformation, préférant plutôt se concentrer sur les incidents sanglants qui attirent les médias. Toutefois, sur le terrain, des réalisations se matérialisent chaque jour. Dans ce pays complètement détruit par la guerre, on mesure les progrès un pas à la fois. Notre mission sera de longue haleine, et il nous arrive de connaître des revers, mais les exemples suivants sont très encourageants.

Dix aéroports régionaux et nationaux ont été remis en service; 83 % de la population a maintenant accès à des services de santé; plus de cinq millions d'enfants (dont un tiers de filles) fréquentent à nouveau l'école; plus de 1000 écoles ont été construites et emploient 45 000 professeurs qualifiés; des femmes siègent aux comités de développement communautaire de 17 000 villages; 52 % des routes ont été asphaltées et 82 % du réseau routier est ouvert au trafic; un million de mines antipersonnel ou antichar ont été détruites; des milliers d'arbres ont été plantés à Kandahar afin de redonner vie à cette ville; l'armée et la police afghanes ont des effectifs de plus de 80 000 personnes.

Je me demande quel serait l'impact du retrait de nos troupes sur le progrès déjà entamé. Je veux faire partie de ces réalisations et j'espère que mon espoir sera contagieux. Les réalisations canadiennes se retrouvent au site suivant: <http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/afghanistan/menu-fr.aspx>.

Et les talibans dans tout ça? Les soldats canadiens se trouvent dans la région la plus troublée de l'Afghanistan. La difficulté d'instaurer la sécurité dans la province de Kandahar est un défi de taille. Nos soldats ont donc été impliqués dans des opérations de combat contre ce groupe extrémiste qui

menace grandement les efforts de stabilisation. Sache que nos opérations respectent les conventions internationales et les lois du droit des conflits armés. Nous ne sommes pas en Afghanistan pour tuer des talibans mais bien pour sécuriser la région afin de permettre la reconstruction des infrastructures et des institutions et de redonner à la population la possibilité de rêver.

Les sujets tabous

Tu as peur pour moi et tu t'inquiéteras quand je serai loin d'ici. Qu'est-ce qu'une petite sœur peut bien dire à son grand frère pour le rassurer? Moi aussi, j'ai peur, et mes confrères aussi, mais ça ne nous empêche pas d'agir. Cette crainte est saine, c'est ce qui me gardera alerte pour prendre la bonne décision au bon moment. Nous nous entraînons depuis six mois pour cette mission. Les volets physiques, psychologiques et techniques ont été abordés dans notre préparation. Je me déploierai avec des camarades d'expérience sur qui je peux compter. Mais malgré tout cet entraînement et le meilleur équipement de protection, il est évident que certains risques ne peuvent être évités. C'est le triste sort qui a été réservé aux 57 militaires qui ont perdu la vie en Afghanistan depuis 2002.

On dit que le fait d'aborder la mort entre nous est un sujet tabou; moi, je crois que c'est une réalité avec laquelle tout soldat doit composer. Il n'y a rien au monde qui puisse justifier la perte d'une sœur pour un frère ou d'un enfant pour un parent. Mais si le pire devait m'arriver, comprends que je me serai assoupie en faisant ce que j'aime. Pour reprendre les paroles de la mère du caporal Shane Keating: «Un homme qui est prêt à sacrifier sa vie pour une cause est un homme extraordinaire.» Au cours de la prochaine année, il y aura 2500 militaires qui voudront faire 2500 actes de bonté pendant leur séjour en Afghanistan. Nous voulons tous faire la différence à notre façon pour «aider les Afghans à s'aider eux-mêmes».

Le soutien de la population

Les implications internationales de nos soldats canadiens sont des contributions qui

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Réponse à mon frère qui s'oppose à mon déploiement en Afghanistan (suite)

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méritent la reconnaissance de la population. Nous ne pouvons pas passer à travers cette épreuve professionnelle sans le soutien de nos familles et de nos amis. Quoi que tu penses des intérêts sous-jacents à cette mission et de l'ampleur de l'injustice de la situation, j'ai besoin de ton soutien moral. C'est cet appui qui permet au soldat de marcher un kilomètre de plus quand il est épuisé, de garder son sang-froid devant un frère d'armes qui s'écroule ou de faire preuve d'humanité dans des circonstances dangereuses. Lors de moments difficiles, et j'ai la certitude qu'il y en aura, j'aurai aussi besoin de ton appui, mon frère.

Je te saluerai à Québec le 22 juin prochain alors que je défilerais devant toi avec mes confrères militaires et que tu manifesteras contre cet événement en regardant passer la parade. Même si nous sommes dans des camps opposés, je sais que le lien qui nous unit est plus fort que ces divergences d'opinion. Je le sais parce que tu as eu le courage de publier une lettre dans les journaux pour m'exprimer tes pensées; je le sais parce que, dans le fond, nous rêvons tous les deux à la paix mondiale; mais surtout, je le sais simplement parce que moi aussi, je t'aime.

SHOOT AND STAY PUT (cont'd)

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were laid down in the late 1980s. With persistent delays, the requirement has snowballed to five different howitzer types. The army recently made the case for importing a truck-mounted howitzer, called the Mounted Gun System, and 180 pieces of an air-drop, ultra-light howitzer weighing 4.5 ton.

Prior to trials in 2002, the army had favoured the ponderous 155/52 mm howitzer as its standard artillery calibre. It is between five and nine ton heavier than the older 155/39 gun used in Kargil but improves the range of the

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L'isolationnisme québécois

Pratte, André

ISOLEMENT - Absence d'engagement avec les autres nations.

Selon un sondage publié cette semaine par le Journal de Montréal, 70% des Québécois s'opposent à la participation des soldats de Valcartier à la mission canadienne en Afghanistan. En 1942, 71% des Québécois votaient contre la conscription visant à combattre Hitler en Europe. Des pourcentages identiques, le même refus massif de la guerre, refus maintes fois répété au cours de notre histoire. Plusieurs y voient la preuve d'un pacifisme profondément enraciné. En réalité, il s'agit d'une attitude bien moins glorieuse: l'isolationnisme. La plupart des Québécois ne veulent pas être mêlés à ce qui se passe hors de leur patelin, du moins du point de vue militaire, et trouveront une foule de prétextes - le journaliste Jean-Charles Harvey parlait de " paravents " - pour couvrir cette indifférence d'un vernis de vertu.

Il y a 65 ans, alors que l'Allemagne occupe plusieurs pays d'Europe, dont notre mère patrie, que de Gaulle appelle le monde à l'aide, l'économiste François-Albert Angers écrit: les Canadiens français " ne sont nullement intéressés à se mêler aux querelles des grandes puissances ". C'est clair.

Les Québécois ont la guerre en horreur, comme tous peuples sains d'esprit. Nous nous opposons aux guerres injustes ou aux motifs purement géopolitiques, ce en quoi nous avons mille fois raison. Nous imposons donc nos conditions. En particulier celle-ci: toute mission armée canadienne devrait se faire dans un cadre multilatéral, avec l'aval de l'ONU. Bravo!

Justement, la mission de l'OTAN en Afghanistan a été approuvée par le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies. Oups... Il nous faut justifier notre opposition par d'autres arguments. Dans Le Devoir, un pacifiste

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déplore " le changement du rôle international des Forces canadiennes vers des opérations guerrières en partenariat avec l'armée états-unienne ". Pourtant, il est évident que la mission en Afghanistan n'est pas la chose des États-Unis. Trente-sept pays ont envoyé des troupes dans ce pays: dont la France (suppôt de Washington, comme on le sait...), l'Italie, l'Espagne, les Pays-Bas, la Suède, l'Allemagne, le Danemark, la Turquie... Tous ces pays enverraient tuer leurs jeunes juste pour faire plaisir à W.?

Les Québécois bien-pensants souhaitent que les pays riches envoient des troupes au Darfour pour mettre fin aux tueries là-bas. Mais que diraient-ils le jour où cette mission, tout aussi complexe que celle d'Afghanistan, s'embourberait? Le jour où nos soldats s'y feraient tuer? Ils dresseraient un nouveau paravent.

La même élite déplorait qu'on fasse la sourde oreille aux appels désespérés du général Roméo Dallaire, au Rwanda. Or, c'est elle aujourd'hui qui tourne le dos au même Dallaire lorsqu'il rappelle: " La responsabilité internationale, ce n'est pas seulement donner de l'argent pour le développement international. C'est aussi des sueurs, des grincements de dents et, parfois, le sang de nos jeunes. "

Pacifistes, les Québécois? En effet: peu importe la gravité de ce qui se passe sur la planète, ils veulent qu'on leur fiche la paix.

Éditorial, le samedi, 23 juin 2007

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The Bofors 152/52 mm howitzer

Shoot and Stay Put

FROM INDIA TODAY - MARCH 19, 2007 EDITION

For an entity that introduced terms like 'shoot and scoot' to the lexicon, the Indian Army's artillery modernisation programme has been remarkably static. In the past five years, the army has held four trials in Rajasthan and Kashmir of two competing gun types – Bofors, now owned by UK's BAE Systems and the Soltam from Israel. It was speculated that these repeated trials had more to do with the looming shadow cast by the Bofors scandal and the potential embarrassment to the UPA if the controversial weapon emerged winner.

However, it seems, nothing could be further from the truth. 'So far, there has been little interference from the Government' says a senior army official. The ongoing analysis of trial results will see the army purchase 1,000 towed artillery pieces for \$2 Billion. The army says it will ask for revalidation of certain parameters of assessment in a possible fifth round of trials and will issue fresh tenders only if these parameters are not satisfied or the competitors pull out.

Last month, the army issued request for proposals to six international firms for an additional 180 wheeled, self-propelled guns costing nearly \$1 Billion. This is the first salvo in the army's field artillery modernisation, a gargantuan two decade programme worth over \$6 Billion that received a fillip after the Kargil war (*Note by Sheldrake. The Kargil War was an armed conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. It took place in May-July 1999. It is one of the most recent examples of high altitude warfare in mountainous terrain.*)

Yet, the programme which aims at equipping all of the army's 230 artillery regiments with towed, wheeled and tracked 155 mm guns is a relic from an age when off-the-shelf purchases were the norms. It is clearly out of sync with the present defence procurement procedure which lays emphasis on joint ventures and transfer of technology to encourage indigenisation of weapon systems.

Specifications of the programme which called for wheeled, tracked and towed howitzers

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Montreal's military origins

by John Kalbfleisch

The sedentary militia was a sad joke. The few volunteers who showed at the annual event often ended up brawling.

"I was agreeably surprised to see a very numerous and respectable muster of the Battalion of Montreal Militia."

Gazette, Friday, July 7, 1854

Well might Looker-On, which is how a letter to The Gazette was signed, be surprised. For some time, the annual muster of Montreal's sedentary militia units had been a joke - and a joke in bad taste, at that. Each year, a growing number of men ignored the law and failed to turn out, while often as not those who did quickly fell to drunken brawling.

And well might Looker-On's surprise have been an agreeable one. Save for these citizen soldiers, Montreal that summer of 1854 had never been so defenceless in the 94 years since it fell to the invading British.

A permanent national defence force, essentially a regular Canadian army, was gradually to emerge in the 1870s and 1880s. Before then, defence was in the hands of various militias and, until most were withdrawn forever in 1871, soldiers of the British army. It was a system attuned to Canadian realities, and in 1854 it was in a shambles.

In numbers alone, the sedentary militia was the biggest force. On paper, anyway, it consisted of every male between the ages of 18 and 60, organized more or less along county lines. But it was "sedentary" - that is, the men sat in their regular civilian jobs every day of the year but one. Only on that single day, scheduled in June after the sowing of crops but before they had to be harvested, were they required to report to the various battalion headquarters. They would endure some rudimentary drills and a rallying speech or two before retreating to the nearest tavern to entertain each other with a year's worth of gossip.

There were fines to ensure a full turnout, but they were rarely levied. Furthermore, by 1854, leadership was in disarray. Many of the old-line militia officers, drawn from prominent families, had been eased out of their positions because their loyalties were suspect. Some had been too close to the rebels of 1837-38; others were caught up in the push a decade later, mainly in Montreal, to see Canada annexed by the United States.

Then, in March of 1854, war broke out. It was more than an ocean away, in the Crimea, where Britain and France were squaring off against Russia, but the impact was felt in Montreal. Most of the British regulars here were pulled out to join the war effort. That left all of Canada to be protected by just 1,695 professional soldiers, including 278 in Montreal. If ever the Americans had a golden opportunity to invade, this was it.

The crisis seems to have focused the minds of at least some in Montreal's sedentary militia. Looker-On, in his letter to The Gazette, recounts how he happened to be walking along Côte St. Pierre Rd. a week earlier on the day of the annual muster and saw the 11th Montreal Battalion turned out in fine array. The 11th was commanded by Lt.- Col. Benjamin Delisle, the long-serving high constable for Montreal. It was one of the few "mixed" units, made up of both French and English speakers.

Looker-On reported that Col. Delisle "was mounted and in full uniform. Captain Prud'homme and his Company were also in uniform and armed. I suppose there were from 400 to 500 of the Battalion present, accompanied by an excellent band formed, I understand, of young men of the battalion."

The Lachine Cavalry under Capt. Alexander Ogilvie of the flour-milling family were also there, "mounted and appointed in every respect." At the same time elsewhere in the city, the Fire Battalion mustered 441 men, a turnout so gratifying that James Perrier, its colonel and a former mayor of Montreal, offered 100 of them for the Crimean campaign.

Alas, other units were less enthusiastic, especially English-speaking ones. Just 95 men from the 4th Battalion deigned to show up,

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and none at all from the 2nd and 3rd. The Montreal Battalion of Rifles managed a dozen officers but not one ordinary ranker. Lt.-Col. Thomas Ryan of the 5th had a decent showing of men, 414, but afterward complained of "neglect of duty on the part of the officers."

In any event, it was probably the last annual muster of the sedentary militia. The system was no way to defend a growing country, and the following year new legislation created militia units whose enrolment would be volunteer, not compulsory, and who would be paid. Sedentary units survived for another two decades, but only in theory - as, in effect, was already the reality.

The Americans, meanwhile, stayed on their own side of the border.

This article by John Kalbfleisch was published in his Column SECOND DRAFT in the July 8, 2007 issue of The Montreal Gazette.

The War on Poppies

U.S. Efforts to Eradicate Afghanistan's Crop are Sowing Seeds of Resentment.

*By Peter Bergen, Sameer Lalwani, New America Foundation
Los Angeles Times | September 2, 2007*

Stepping onto the balcony of the governor's mansion in Uruzgan in southern Afghanistan, you quickly grasp the scale of the drug problem gripping the country. Beginning at the walls of the mansion and stretching as far as the eye can see are hundreds of acres of poppy fields ready for harvesting for opium sap, pretty much the only way to earn a living in poverty-stricken Uruzgan.

In late April, at the height of poppy-growing season, a team of more than 200 police officers from Kabul led by contractors working for the American company DynCorp International arrived in Uruzgan to undertake the first eradication efforts in the province. After some tense negotiations with local officials, the teams went out to begin destroying the poppy fields. For two days, nothing much happened, mostly because of a dispute about which fields were to be eradicated. But on the third day, when the work was getting underway in

earnest, a Taliban-led force bearing small arms, rocket-propelled grenades and mortars appeared from nowhere and attacked the eradication teams as they destroyed the fields. Four Afghan police officers were seriously injured.

The Uruzgan attack demonstrated, for those who hadn't yet figured it out, just how the Taliban is seeking to exploit popular resentment against eradication efforts. All across the country, Afghan support for poppy cultivation is on the upswing; 40% of Afghans now consider it acceptable if there is no other way to earn a living, and in the southwest, where much of the poppy crop is grown, two out of three people say it is acceptable. In Uruzgan's neighboring province, Helmand -- which supplies about half the world's opium, the raw material for heroin -- favorable ratings for the Taliban now run as high as 27% (compared with 10% in the whole of Afghanistan).

Instead of taking such findings to heart, the Bush administration's counter-narcotics policy over the last three years has placed eradication at its center, even though it has been met with growing Afghan skepticism and, in some cases, violence, and has coincided with a general decline in public support for the U.S. and NATO mission in Afghanistan. Why is the policy so unpopular? Consider that Afghanistan's farmers will produce an estimated 9,000 tons of opium this year from 477,000 acres, according to a United Nations report released last week, and that the total farm value of the crop will be about \$1 billion. Most farmers who cultivate poppies do so because few other options -- either alternative crops or alternative livelihoods -- exist in their part of the world. You simply cannot eviscerate the livelihoods of the estimated 3 million Afghans who grow poppies and not expect a backlash.

What's more, our policy is not effective. Though the U.S. spends about the same amount on counter-narcotics activities in Afghanistan annually as all Afghan poppy farmers combined take home in a year, our policies have not prevented record-setting poppy crops from springing up with every

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The War on Poppies (cont'd)

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succeeding year, nor have they prevented Afghanistan from becoming a quasi-narcostate where corruption is rampant. Last week's U.N. report said Afghanistan continues to be the center of the world's heroin trade, accounting for 93% of global opium production. It noted a 17% spike in poppy cultivation in the last year, on the heels of a record 59% rise the year before.

The U.S. government, in short, is deeply committed to an unsuccessful drug policy that helps its enemies. The Taliban derives not only substantial financial benefits from the opium trade, according to U.S. military officials in Afghanistan, but wins political benefits from its supportive stance on poppy growing, masterfully exploiting situations in which U.S.-sponsored eradication forces are pitted against poor farmers.

Eradication has also become a wedge in the fragile relationship of the NATO countries that are part of the coalition in Afghanistan. Many European countries, including the Dutch, who have forces stationed in Uruzgan, oppose the American eradication policy. The U.S. needs its NATO partners to maintain the legitimacy of the multinational force in Afghanistan. Holding to a failed eradication policy threatens those relationships.

In early August, the U.S. State Department presented its updated counter-narcotics strategy for Afghanistan. For the most part, the proposal offered few new initiatives other than a welcome emphasis on cracking down on drug kingpins. At its center, the strategy still depends on eradication efforts, along with veiled hints that the U.S. government may also pursue aerial chemical spraying, a tactic that many fear will further alienate the Afghan population. The increased funds set aside in the new plan to help farmers find alternative livelihoods -- \$50 million to \$60 million -- are woefully inadequate and constitute a paltry 6% of American counter-narcotics spending in Afghanistan for 2007. Eradication continues to receive the largest share of the budget.

The State Department strategy misses the forest for the trees. The priority of the United States and NATO should be first to thwart the Taliban insurgency while bettering the lives of typical Afghans through significant economic and reconstruction efforts to win hearts and minds. Doing nothing on the poppy front would do more to achieve this goal than the counterproductive eradication path the U.S. currently pursues. The U.S. should adopt a "first do no harm" policy that temporarily suspends eradication while implementing a promising portfolio of new initiatives to build up alternatives for farmers.

To begin with, the U.S. needs to invest in building up the legitimate Afghan economy. Though poppy fetches much higher prices than most other crops, subsidies, price supports and seeds for alternative crops should be offered to offset that price gap. Because other crops often face pitfalls such as the absence of distributors, domestic demand or consistent prices abroad, the international community should help Kabul set up an agency, modeled on the Canadian Wheat Board, that would purchase crops from farmers at consistent prices, and market and distribute them internationally. The U.S. and other NATO countries should open their markets and extend trade preferences to Afghan agricultural products and handicrafts

Currently, the U.S. funds alternative livelihoods at one-third the rate of eradication efforts -- and the money is still not making its way into the pockets of farmers. Because of bureaucratic inefficiencies, only 1% of the \$100 million in funds for alternative livelihoods had been disbursed as of March, according to the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime. One reason for this is that the Afghan narcotics ministry lacks the staff and skills to quickly and effectively disburse funds. So the task should be outsourced -- in the same manner the U.S. outsources its eradication efforts to private companies like DynCorp -- until the Afghan government develops the capacity to get the job done.

The U.S. and NATO should also endorse a pilot project proposed by the Senlis Council, an international nongovernmental

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Troops should stay until 2010

Parliament is wrong to consider 2009 pullout from Afghanistan

BOB BERGEN

It's time Canadians stopped focusing solely on 2009 as a possible date for Canadian troop withdrawals from Afghanistan and started thinking about the end of 2010.

That is because there is a very serious gap in the thinking of those who would pull the Canadian Forces out of Afghanistan in February 2009 or, in the case of the New Democratic Party, right now.

They ignore the fact Canada pledged its full support for the Afghanistan Compact, a 2006 agreement between the Afghanistan government and the international community represented by more than 60 states and intergovernmental organizations, to help rebuild the war-ravaged country.

Ingrained like a watermark throughout the compact and related documents is the timeline date "end-2010."

End-2010 is the date by which the Afghan government, with the help of the international community, is committed to achieve its benchmark of 70,000 fully trained and equipped Afghan National Army troops capable of meeting Afghanistan's security needs.

End-2010 is the date by which they are committed to achieve the benchmark of 62,000 fully constituted and professional Afghan National Police and Afghan Border Police.

End-2010 is the date by which they are committed to achieving their stated counter-narcotics capacity benchmarks, mine-action and ammunition-reduction targets, public-administration reform, rule-of-law frameworks, human rights obligations, waterresource management, urban development, education goals, health and nutrition benchmarks, and plans for agriculture and rural development, poverty reduction, and on and on to rebuild Afghanistan society.

A remarkable string of success stories is found in the compact's Joint Co-ordination and Monitoring Board's first-annual, but little-

noticed progress report released in May indicating long strides toward those goals.

The Afghan National Army, which is key to the country's security, is well on its way to its benchmark of 70,000 troops with a strength of 37,015, an additional 12,044 in training and recruiting of 8,208 personnel annually on track for 2010.

As of March this year, the Afghan National and Border Police numbered 62,200 with the intention of raising their number to 82,000, which is beyond the 2010 stated goal.

Since March 2006, stockpiles of 481,000 landmines had been located and destroyed, 132,080,792 square metres of land had been cleared and more than one million pieces of unexploded ordinance had been destroyed.

On the social side, there were 5.4 million students enrolled in schools, 35 per cent of whom are girls; 82 per cent of Afghans had access to the basic package of health services and 6,121 Community Development Councils had been established.

In terms of infrastructure, 84 per cent of Afghanistan's 2,818 kilometres of ring roads is open with 59 per cent or 1,983 kilometres paved.

That is just one year into the Afghan compact process and there are simply too many success stories documented over hundreds of pages in the progress report to list here, but, as the report points out, numbers alone don't tell the whole tale.

The compact's goal is "to improve the lives of Afghan people and to contribute to national, regional and global peace and security."

Obviously, the picture in Afghanistan is not all rosy and difficult challenges lie ahead.

For example, a record number of poppy fields were eradicated, but poppy cultivation increased by a record 50 per cent and raw opium by 40 per cent, fuelling a corrupt narco-economy.

While the police have reached their recruiting benchmark, they remain largely corrupt and their loyalty is questionable.

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Troops should stay until 2010 (cont'd)

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And, thanks to Pakistan's internal woes, the Taliban and Al-Qa'ida have been able to reconstitute themselves and retrain in its lawless tribal areas bordering southern Afghanistan where the Canadians operate.

What does the Afghanistan compact's 2010 benchmark mean for Canada?

Only time will tell. Prime Minister Stephen Harper's government sought and received a parliamentary mandate to extend the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan only until February 2009.

Liberal leader Stéphane Dion says the Liberals will not support keeping Canadians in Afghanistan past 2009.

The Harper government's decision to put the mission's extension to a vote was far more than Jean Chrétien's Liberal government did when it arbitrarily deployed the Canadian Forces to Afghanistan to fight the remnants of Al-Qa'ida and the Taliban alongside the Americans in October 2001.

Parliament's committee on national defence has recommended a parliamentary debate be held in 2008 on whether the mission should be extended past February 2009.

That debate is sorely needed because I think it would reveal the Liberals have a moral obligation to help Harper's government finish what the Liberals helped start, in light of the new successes documented in the compact's progress report.

As for the NDP, it would turn its backs on NATO and the Afghan government's achievements, pull out now and abandon Afghanistan to the Taliban.

Choosing between clear progress and Taliban-inspired anarchy, one would think, would be an easy choice.

Bob Bergen is a research fellow with the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute in Calgary.

The War on Poppies (cont'd)

organization with offices in southern Afghanistan, to harness poppy cultivation for the production of legal medicinal opiates such

as morphine for sale to countries, such as Brazil, that are in short supply of cheap pain drugs for patients.

The U.S. must stop targeting poor farmers and focus on the traffickers who make the bulk of the profits from heroin. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration agents on the ground should step up efforts to interrupt money-laundering networks and interdict labs and shipments. The DEA should also turn Afghanistan's shame-based culture to its advantage by making public the list of top Afghan drug suspects, including government officials, as it did in the 1990s, when it publicized the names of Colombia's drug kingpins.

The U.S. Government Accountability Office and the Council on Foreign Relations estimate that the elimination of narcotics from the Afghan economy will take well over a decade. Given that time frame, our counter-narcotics policy needs to be guided by a clear strategic purpose -- providing security and defeating the Taliban. These are not simple drug dealers but narcoterrorists with a political agenda. A "first do no harm" approach would ensure that battling the drug trade does not compromise the fight against the terrorists.

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Le Mot du Président (suite)

(Suite de la page 3)

démontre à nouveau qu'elle appartient à la «droite de la ligne».

À la fin, lors du Dîner régimentaire au Mess des officiers de Shilo, nous avons été témoins du changement de colonel commandant entre le maj.-gén. John Arch MacInnis et le bgén. Ernie Beno.

Comme vous pouvez le constater, la table est mise pour une autre année marquante, aussi bien pour nous que pour le Régiment, et votre Association sera en avant de la marche durant toute cette année spéciale, laquelle se terminera avec le grand événement de la ville de Québec en septembre 2008. Ubique.

Le major à la retraite

Donald Dussault

Why Study War?

Military history teaches us about honor, sacrifice, and the inevitability of conflict.

Victor Davis Hanson

Summer 2007

Try explaining to a college student that Tet was an American military victory. You'll provoke not a counterargument—let alone an assent—but a blank stare: Who or what was Tet? Doing interviews about the recent hit movie *300*, I encountered similar bewilderment from listeners and hosts. Not only did most of them not know who the 300 were or what Thermopylae was; they seemed clueless about the Persian Wars altogether.

It's no surprise that civilian Americans tend to lack a basic understanding of military matters. Even when I was a graduate student, 30-some years ago, military history—understood broadly as the investigation of why one side wins and another loses a war, and encompassing reflections on magisterial or foolish generalship, technological stagnation or breakthrough, and the roles of discipline, bravery, national will, and culture in determining a conflict's outcome and its consequences—had already become unfashionable on campus. Today, universities are even less receptive to the subject.

This state of affairs is profoundly troubling, for democratic citizenship requires knowledge of war—and now, in the age of weapons of mass annihilation, more than ever.

I came to the study of warfare in an odd way, at the age of 24. Without ever taking a class in military history, I naively began writing about war for a Stanford classics dissertation that explored the effects of agricultural devastation in ancient Greece, especially the Spartan ravaging of the Athenian countryside during the Peloponnesian War. The topic fascinated me. Was the strategy effective? Why assume that ancient armies with primitive tools could easily burn or cut trees, vines, and grain on thousands of acres of enemy farms, when on my family farm in Selma, California, it took me almost an hour to fell a mature fruit tree with a sharp modern axe? Yet even if the

invaders couldn't starve civilian populations, was the destruction still harmful psychologically? Did it goad proud agrarians to come out and fight? And what did the practice tell us about the values of the Greeks—and of the generals who persisted in an operation that seemingly brought no tangible results?

I posed these questions to my prospective thesis advisor, adding all sorts of further justifications. The topic was central to understanding the Peloponnesian War, I noted. The research would be interdisciplinary—a big plus in the modern university—drawing not just on ancient military histories but also on archaeology, classical drama, epigraphy, and poetry. I could bring a personal dimension to the research, too, having grown up around veterans of both world wars who talked constantly about battle. And from my experience on the farm, I wanted to add practical details about growing trees and vines in a Mediterranean climate.

Yet my advisor was skeptical. Agrarian wars, indeed wars of any kind, weren't popular in classics Ph.D. programs, even though farming and fighting were the ancient Greeks' two most common pursuits, the sources of anecdote, allusion, and metaphor in almost every Greek philosophical, historical, and literary text. Few classicists seemed to care any more that most notable Greek writers, thinkers, and statesmen—from Aeschylus to Pericles to Xenophon—had served in the phalanx or on a trireme at sea. Dozens of nineteenth-century dissertations and monographs on ancient warfare—on the organization of the Spartan army, the birth of Greek tactics, the strategic thinking of Greek generals, and much more—went largely unread. Nor was the discipline of military history, once central to a liberal education, in vogue on campuses in the seventies. It was as if the university had forgotten that history itself had begun with Herodotus and Thucydides as the story of armed conflicts.

What lay behind this academic lack of interest? The most obvious explanation: this was the immediate post-Vietnam era. The public perception in the Carter years was that

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Why Study War? (cont'd)

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America had lost a war that for moral and practical reasons it should never have fought—a catastrophe, for many in the universities, that it must never repeat. The necessary corrective wasn't to learn how such wars started, went forward, and were lost. Better to ignore anything that had to do with such odious business in the first place.

The nuclear pessimism of the cold war, which followed the horror of two world wars, also dampened academic interest. The postwar obscenity of Mutually Assured Destruction had lent an apocalyptic veneer to contemporary war: as President Kennedy warned, "Mankind must put an end to war, or war will put an end to mankind." Conflict had become something so destructive, in this view, that it no longer had any relation to the battles of the past. It seemed absurd to worry about a new tank or a novel doctrine of counterinsurgency when the press of a button, unleashing nuclear Armageddon, would render all military thinking superfluous.

Further, the sixties had ushered in a utopian view of society antithetical to serious thinking about war. Government, the military, business, religion, and the family had conspired, the new Rousseauians believed, to warp the naturally peace-loving individual. Conformity and coercion smothered our innately pacifist selves. To assert that wars broke out because bad men, in fear or in pride, sought material advantage or status, or because good men had done too little to stop them, was now seen as antithetical to an enlightened understanding of human nature. "What difference does it make," in the words of the much-quoted Mahatma Gandhi, "to the dead, the orphans, and the homeless whether the mad destruction is wrought under the name of totalitarianism or the holy name of liberty and democracy?"

The academic neglect of war is even more acute today. Military history as a discipline has atrophied, with very few professorships, journal articles, or degree programs. In 2004, Edward Coffman, a retired military history professor who taught at the University of

Wisconsin, reviewed the faculties of the top 25 history departments, as ranked by *U.S. News and World Report*. He found that of over 1,000 professors, only 21 identified war as a specialty. When war does show up on university syllabi, it's often about the race, class, and gender of combatants and wartime civilians. So a class on the Civil War will focus on the Underground Railroad and Reconstruction, not on Chancellorsville and Gettysburg. One on World War II might emphasize Japanese internment, Rosie the Riveter, and the horror of Hiroshima, not Guadalcanal and Midway. A survey of the Vietnam War will devote lots of time to the inequities of the draft, media coverage, and the antiwar movement at home, and scant the air and artillery barrages at Khe Sanh.

Those who want to study war in the traditional way face intense academic suspicion, as Margaret Atwood's poem "The Loneliness of the Military Historian" suggests: Confess: it's my profession that alarms you.

This is why few people ask me to dinner, though Lord knows I don't go out of my way to be scary.

Historians of war must derive perverse pleasure, their critics suspect, from reading about carnage and suffering. Why not figure out instead how to outlaw war forever, as if it were not a tragic, nearly inevitable aspect of human existence? Hence the recent surge of "peace studies" (see "The Peace Racket").

The university's aversion to the study of war certainly doesn't reflect public lack of interest in the subject. Students love old-fashioned war classes on those rare occasions when they're offered, usually as courses that professors sneak in when the choice of what to teach is left up to them. I taught a number of such classes at California State University, Stanford, and elsewhere. They'd invariably wind up overenrolled, with hordes of students lingering after office hours to offer opinions on the battles of Marathon and Lepanto.

Popular culture, too, displays extraordinary enthusiasm for all things military. There's a new Military History Channel, and Hollywood churns out a steady supply of blockbuster war

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movies, from *Saving Private Ryan* to *300*. The post-Ken Burns explosion of interest in the Civil War continues. Historical reenactment societies stage history's great battles, from the Roman legions' to the Wehrmacht's. Barnes and Noble and Borders bookstores boast well-stocked military history sections, with scores of new titles every month. A plethora of websites obsess over strategy and tactics. Hit video games grow ever more realistic in their reconstructions of battles.

The public may feel drawn to military history because it wants to learn about honor and sacrifice, or because of interest in technology—the muzzle velocity of a Tiger Tank's 88mm cannon, for instance—or because of a pathological need to experience violence, if only vicariously. The importance—and challenge—of the academic study of war is to elevate that popular enthusiasm into a more capacious and serious understanding, one that seeks answers to such questions as: Why do wars break out? How do they end? Why do the winners win and the losers lose? How best to avoid wars or contain their worst effects?

A wartime public illiterate about the conflicts of the past can easily find itself paralyzed in the acrimony of the present. Without standards of historical comparison, it will prove ill equipped to make informed judgments. Neither our politicians nor most of our citizens seem to recall the incompetence and terrible decisions that, in December 1777, December 1941, and November 1950, led to massive American casualties and, for a time, public despair. So it's no surprise that today so many seem to think that the violence in Iraq is unprecedented in our history. Roughly 3,000 combat dead in Iraq in some four years of fighting is, of course, a terrible thing. And it has provoked national outrage to the point of considering withdrawal and defeat, as we still bicker over up-armored Humvees and proper troop levels. But a previous generation considered Okinawa a stunning American victory, and prepared to follow it with an invasion of the Japanese mainland itself—despite losing, in a little over two months, four times as many Americans as we have lost in Iraq, casualties of faulty intelligence, poor

generalship, and suicidal head-on assaults against fortified positions.

It's not that military history offers cookie-cutter comparisons with the past. Germany's World War I victory over Russia in under three years and her failure to take France in four apparently misled Hitler into thinking that he could overrun the Soviets in three or four weeks—after all, he had brought down historically tougher France in just six. Similarly, the conquest of the Taliban in eight weeks in 2001, followed by the establishment of constitutional government within a year in Kabul, did not mean that the similarly easy removal of Saddam Hussein in three weeks in 2003 would ensure a working Iraqi democracy within six months. The differences between the countries—cultural, political, geographical, and economic—were too great.

Instead, knowledge of past wars establishes wide parameters of what to expect from new ones. Themes, emotions, and rhetoric remain constant over the centuries, and thus generally predictable. Athens's disastrous expedition in 415 BC against Sicily, the largest democracy in the Greek world, may not prefigure our war in Iraq. But the story of the Sicilian calamity does instruct us on how consensual societies can clamor for war—yet soon become disheartened and predicate their support on the perceived pulse of the battlefield.

Military history teaches us, contrary to popular belief these days, that wars aren't necessarily the most costly of human calamities. The first Gulf War took few lives in getting Saddam out of Kuwait; doing nothing in Rwanda allowed savage gangs and militias to murder hundreds of thousands with impunity. Hitler, Mao, Pol Pot, and Stalin killed far more off the battlefield than on it. The 1918 Spanish flu epidemic brought down more people than World War I did. And more Americans—over 3.2 million—lost their lives driving over the last 90 years than died in combat in this nation's 231-year history. Perhaps what bothers us about wars, though, isn't just their horrific lethality but also that people choose to wage them—which makes them seem avoidable, unlike a flu virus or a

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Why Study War? (cont'd)

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car wreck, and their tolls unduly grievous. Yet military history also reminds us that war sometimes has an eerie utility: as British strategist Basil H. Liddell Hart put it, "War is always a matter of doing evil in the hope that good may come of it." Wars—or threats of wars—put an end to chattel slavery, Nazism, fascism, Japanese militarism, and Soviet Communism.

Military history is as often the story of appeasement as of warmongering. The destructive military careers of Alexander the Great, Caesar, Napoleon, and Hitler would all have ended early had any of their numerous enemies united when the odds favored them. Western air power stopped Slobodan Milošević's reign of terror at little cost to NATO forces—but only after a near-decade of inaction and dialogue had made possible the slaughter of tens of thousands. Affluent Western societies have often proved reluctant to use force to prevent greater future violence. "War is an ugly thing, but not the ugliest of things," observed the British philosopher John Stuart Mill. "The decayed and degraded state of moral and patriotic feeling which thinks that nothing is worth war is much worse."

Indeed, by ignoring history, the modern age is free to interpret war as a failure of communication, of diplomacy, of talking—as if aggressors don't know exactly what they're doing. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, frustrated by the Bush administration's intransigence in the War on Terror, flew to Syria, hoping to persuade President Assad to stop funding terror in the Middle East. She assumed that Assad's belligerence resulted from our aloofness and arrogance rather than from his dictatorship's interest in destroying democracy in Lebanon and Iraq, before such contagious freedom might in fact destroy him. For a therapeutically inclined generation raised on Oprah and Dr. Phil—and not on the letters of William Tecumseh Sherman and William Shirer's *Berlin Diary*—problems between states, like those in our personal lives, should be argued about by equally

civilized and peaceful rivals, and so solved without resorting to violence.

Yet it's hard to find many wars that result from miscommunication. Far more often they break out because of malevolent intent and the absence of deterrence. Margaret Atwood also wrote in her poem: "Wars happen because the ones who start them / think they can win." Hitler did; so did Mussolini and Tojo—and their assumptions were logical, given the relative disarmament of the Western democracies at the time. Bin Laden attacked on September 11 not because there was a dearth of American diplomats willing to dialogue with him in the Hindu Kush. Instead, he recognized that a series of Islamic terrorist assaults against U.S. interests over two decades had met with no meaningful reprisals, and concluded that decadent Westerners would never fight, whatever the provocation—or that, if we did, we would withdraw as we had from Mogadishu.

In the twenty-first century, it's easier than ever to succumb to technological determinism, the idea that science, new weaponry, and globalization have altered the very rules of war. But military history teaches us that our ability to strike a single individual from 30,000 feet up with a GPS bomb or a jihadist's efforts to have his propaganda beamed to millions in real time do not necessarily transform the conditions that determine who wins and who loses wars.

True, instant communications may compress decision making, and generals must be skilled at news conferences that can now influence the views of millions worldwide. Yet these are really just new wrinkles on the old face of war. The improvised explosive device versus the up-armored Humvee is simply an updated take on the catapult versus the stone wall or the arquebus versus the mailed knight. The long history of war suggests no static primacy of the defensive or the offensive, or of one sort of weapon over the other, but just temporary advantages gained by particular strategies and technologies that go unanswered for a time by less adept adversaries.

So it's highly doubtful, the study of war tells us, that a new weapon will emerge from the

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Pentagon or anywhere else that will change the very nature of armed conflict—unless some sort of genetic engineering so alters man's brain chemistry that he begins to act in unprecedented ways. We fought the 1991 Gulf War with dazzling, computer-enhanced weaponry. But lost in the technological pizzazz was the basic wisdom that we need to fight wars with political objectives in mind and that, to conclude them decisively, we must defeat and even humiliate our enemies, so that they agree to abandon their prewar behavior. For some reason, no American general or diplomat seemed to understand that crucial point 16 years ago, with the result that, on the cessation of hostilities, Saddam Hussein's supposedly defeated generals used their gunships to butcher Kurds and Shiites while Americans looked on. And because we never achieved the war's proper aim—ensuring that Iraq would not use its petro-wealth to destroy the peace of the region—we have had to fight a second war of no-fly zones, and then a third war to remove Saddam, and now a fourth war, of counterinsurgency, to protect the fledgling Iraqi democracy.

Military history reminds us of important anomalies and paradoxes. When Sparta invaded Attica in the first spring of the Peloponnesian war, Thucydides recounts, it expected the Athenians to surrender after a few short seasons of ravaging. They didn't—but a plague that broke out unexpectedly did more damage than thousands of Spartan ravagers did. Twenty-seven years later, a maritime Athens lost the war at sea to Sparta, an insular land power that started the conflict with scarcely a navy. The 2003 removal of Saddam refuted doom-and-gloom critics who predicted thousands of deaths and millions of refugees, just as the subsequent messy four-year reconstruction hasn't evolved as anticipated into a quiet, stable democracy—to say the least.

The size of armies doesn't guarantee battlefield success: the victors at Salamis, Issos, Mexico City, and Lepanto were all outnumbered. War's most savage moments—the Allied summer offensive of 1918, the Russian siege of Berlin in the spring of 1945,

the Battle of the Bulge, Hiroshima—often unfold right before hostilities cease. And democratic leaders during war—think of Winston Churchill, Harry Truman, and Richard Nixon—often leave office either disgraced or unpopular.

It would be reassuring to think that the righteousness of a cause, or the bravery of an army, or the nobility of a sacrifice ensures public support for war. But military history shows that far more often the *perception* of winning is what matters. Citizens turn abruptly on any leaders deemed culpable for losing. "Public sentiment is everything," wrote Abraham Lincoln. "With public sentiment nothing can fail. Without it nothing can succeed. He who molds opinion is greater than he who enacts laws." Lincoln knew that lesson well. Gettysburg and Vicksburg were brilliant Union victories that by summer 1863 had restored Lincoln's previously shaky credibility. But a year later, after the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, Petersburg, and Cold Harbor battles—Cold Harbor claimed 7,000 Union lives in 20 minutes—the public reviled him. Neither Lincoln nor his policies had changed, but the Confederate ability to kill large numbers of Union soldiers had.

Ultimately, public opinion follows the ups and downs—including the perception of the ups and downs—of the battlefield, since victory excites the most ardent pacifist and defeat silences the most zealous zealot. After the defeat of France, the losses to Bomber Command, the U-boat rampage, and the fall of Greece, Singapore, and Dunkirk, Churchill took the blame for a war as seemingly lost as, a little later, it seemed won by the brilliant prime minister after victories in North Africa, Sicily, and Normandy. When the successful military action against Saddam Hussein ended in April 2003, over 70 percent of the American people backed it, with politicians and pundits alike elbowing each other aside to take credit for their prescient support. Four years of insurgency later, Americans oppose a now-orphaned war by the same margin. General George S. Patton may have been uncouth, but he wasn't wrong when he bellowed, "Americans love a winner and will not tolerate a loser." The American public

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Why Study War? (cont'd)

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turned on the Iraq War not because of Cindy Sheehan or Michael Moore but because it felt that the battlefield news had turned uniformly bad and that the price in American lives and treasure for ensuring Iraqi reform was too dear.

Finally, military history has the moral purpose of educating us about past sacrifices that have secured our present freedom and security. If we know nothing of Shiloh, Belleau Wood, Tarawa, and Chosun, the crosses in our military cemeteries are just pleasant white stones on lush green lawns. They no longer serve as reminders that thousands endured pain and hardship for our right to listen to what we wish on our iPods and to shop at Wal-Mart in safety—or that they expected future generations, links in this great chain of obligation, to do the same for those not yet born. The United States was born through war, reunited by war, and saved from destruction by war. No future generation, however comfortable and affluent, should escape that terrible knowledge.

What, then, can we do to restore the study of war to its proper place in the life of the American mind? The challenge isn't just to reform the graduate schools or the professoriate, though that would help. On a deeper level, we need to reexamine the larger forces that have devalued the very idea of military history—of war itself. We must abandon the naive faith that with enough money, education, or good intentions we can change the nature of mankind so that conflict, as if by fiat, becomes a thing of the past. In the end, the study of war reminds us that we will never be gods. We will always just be men, it tells us. Some men will always prefer war to peace; and other men, we who have learned from the past, have a moral obligation to stop them.

Studying War: Where to Start

While Thucydides' *Peloponnesian War*, a chronicle of the three-decade war between Athens and Sparta, establishes the genre of military history, the best place to begin

studying war is with the soldiers' stories themselves. E. B. Sledge's memoir of Okinawa, *With the Old Breed*, is nightmarish, but it reminds us that war, while it often translates to rot, filth, and carnage, can also be in the service of a noble cause. Elmer Bendiner's tragic retelling of the annihilation of B-17s over Germany, *The Fall of Fortresses: A Personal Account of the Most Daring, and Deadly, American Air Battles of World War II*, is an unrecognized classic.

From a different wartime perspective—that of the generals—U. S. Grant's *Personal Memoirs* is justly celebrated as a model of prose. Yet the nearly contemporaneous *Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman* is far more analytical in its dissection of the human follies and pretensions that lead to war. Likewise, George S. Patton's *War As I Knew It* is not only a compilation of the eccentric general's diary entries but also a candid assessment of human nature itself.

Fiction often captures the experience of war as effectively as memoir, beginning with Homer's *Iliad*, in which Achilles confronts the paradox that rewards do not always go to the most deserving in war. The three most famous novels about the futility of conflict are *The Red Badge of Courage*, by Stephen Crane, *All Quiet on the Western Front*, by Erich Maria Remarque, and *August 1914*, by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. No work has better insights on the folly of war, however, than Euripides' *Trojan Women*.

Although many contemporary critics find it passé to document landmark battles in history, one can find a storehouse of information in *The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World*, by Edward S. Creasy, and *A Military History of the Western World*, by J. F. C. Fuller. Hans Delbrück's *History of the Art of War* and Russell F. Weigley's *The Age of Battles* center their sweeping histories on decisive engagements, using battles like Marathon and Waterloo as tools to illustrate larger social, political, and cultural values. A sense of high drama permeates William H. Prescott's *History of the Conquest of Mexico* and *History of the Conquest of Peru*, while tragedy more often characterizes Steven

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Runciman's spellbinding short account *The Fall of Constantinople 1453* and Donald Morris's massive *The Washing of the Spears*, about the rise and fall of the Zulu Empire. The most comprehensive and accessible one-volume treatment of history's most destructive war remains Gerhard L. Weinberg's *A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II*.

Relevant histories for our current struggle with Middle East terrorism are Alistair Horne's superb *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962*, Michael Oren's *Six Days of War*, and Mark Bowden's *Black Hawk Down*. Anything John Keegan writes is worth reading; *The Face of Battle* remains the most impressive general military history of the last 50 years.

Biography too often winds up ignored in the study of war. Plutarch's lives of Pericles, Alcibiades, Julius Caesar, Pompey, and Alexander the Great established the traditional view of these great captains as men of action, while weighing their record of near-superhuman achievement against their megalomania. Elizabeth Longford's *Wellington* is a classic study of England's greatest soldier. *Lee's Lieutenants: A Study in Command*, by Douglas Southall Freeman, has been slighted recently but is spellbinding.

If, as Carl von Clausewitz believed, "War is the continuation of politics by other means," then study of civilian wartime leadership is critical. The classic scholarly account of the proper relationship between the military and its overseers is still Samuel P. Huntington's *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. For a contemporary *J'accuse* of American military leadership during the Vietnam War, see H. R. McMaster's *Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam*.

Eliot A. Cohen's *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime* is purportedly a favorite read of President Bush's. It argues that successful leaders like Ben-Gurion, Churchill, Clemenceau, and Lincoln kept a tight rein on their generals and never confused officers' esoteric military

expertise with either political sense or strategic resolution.

In *The Mask of Command*, Keegan examines the military competence of Alexander the Great, Wellington, Grant, and Hitler, and comes down on the side of the two who fought under consensual government. In *The Soul of Battle*, I took that argument further and suggested that three of the most audacious generals—Epaminondas, Sherman, and Patton—were also keen political thinkers, with strategic insight into what made their democratic armies so formidable.

How politicians lose wars is also of interest. See especially Ian Kershaw's biography *Hitler, 1936-1945: Nemesis*. Mark Moyar's first volume of a proposed two-volume reexamination of Vietnam, *Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954-1965*, is akin to reading Euripides' tales of self-inflicted woe and missed chances. Horne has written a half-dozen classics, none more engrossing than his tragic *To Lose a Battle: France 1940*.

Few historians can weave military narrative into the contemporary political and cultural landscape. James McPherson's *Battle Cry of Freedom* does, and his volume began the recent renaissance of Civil War history. Barbara Tuchman's *The Guns of August* describes the first month of World War I in riveting but excruciatingly sad detail. Two volumes by David McCullough, *Truman* and *1776*, give fascinating inside accounts of the political will necessary to continue wars amid domestic depression and bad news from the front. So does Martin Gilbert's *Winston S. Churchill: Finest Hour, 1939-1941*. Donald Kagan's *On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace* warns against the dangers of appeasement, especially the lethal combination of tough rhetoric with no military preparedness, in a survey of wars from ancient Greece to the Cuban missile crisis. Robert Kagan's *Dangerous Nation* reminds Americans that their idealism (if not self-righteousness) is nothing new but rather helps explain more than two centuries of both wise and ill-considered intervention abroad.

Any survey on military history should conclude with more abstract lessons about

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Why Study War? (cont'd)

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war. *Principles of War* by Clausewitz remains the cornerstone of the science. Niccolò Machiavelli's *The Art of War* blends realism with classical military detail. Two indispensable works, *War: Ends and Means*, by Angelo Codevilla and Paul Seabury, and *Makers of Modern Strategy*, edited by Peter Paret, provide refreshingly honest accounts of the timeless rules and nature of war.

—Victor Davis Hanson

Notice to our Readers

If you read an article that you feel may be of interest to other readers of Sheldrake's Log, do not hesitate to mail us a copy at:

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La journée des dames/ Ladies Day

Our Friday Lunch on June 1 was designated "La journée des dames/Ladies Day" and was well attended by a number of our members, accompanied by their wives.

In the two photos below, we see a number of these couples.



Dans l'ordre habituel: Arthur Vandal, Colette Bégin, Denise Vandal, Paul Bégin, Annette Marceau et Pierre Marceau



À table: Jean Jacques Richard et Solange Richard, André Lacavalier et Édith Lecavalier, Paul Bégin et Collette Bégin.
Derrière: Louise Gélinas, John Grimshire, Charles de Kovachich, Bill Cloutier et Gilbert Saint-Louis.