

Bulletin des Artilleurs de Montréal

Sheldrake's Log

Montreal Gunners Newsletter



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Dans quelques semaines 10 artilleurs du 2^{ième} régiment d'artillerie de campagne de Montréal s'envoleront vers l'Afghanistan comme membres de la relève 1-09. Ils feront partie d'un groupe de soldats bien entraîné et bien vu qui seront impliqués dans les combats les plus difficiles impliquant des canadiens depuis la guerre de Corée. Il est bien connu, dans les milieux militaires, que les mois qui viennent seront particulièrement difficiles sur le terrain. La situation politique en Afghanistan et les élections prochaines engendreront une mixture explosive que les Talibans voudront exploiter.

Les membres suivants du 2^{ième} ont fait un pas en avant et s'envoleront sous peu :

Serviront avec le Groupe de combat (artillerie) :
Lt Cairns : Comd tp, Adjudant Fortin : Adjudant technicien PC, Bombardier-chef Laporte : chef de pièce en second, Bombardier Winter : technicien PC, Bombardier Depar : serveur, Artilleur Gagné-Michaud : serveur, Artilleur Gagnon : serveur.

Servira avec ELMO (Équipe de mentorat et de liaison):

Adjudant Moloughney : Mentor artillerie (Ce sera un second tour pour l'adjudant)

Serviront avec ESN (Élément de support national):
Caporal Kaddah : commis aux contrats, Artilleur Didone : chargement des hélicoptères.

Nos pensées les accompagneront.

Ubique, Votre observateur.

In the next few weeks 10 Gunners of Montreal's 2 Field Artillery Regiment will fly out to Afghanistan as members of Task Force 1-09. They will be part of the highly trained and highly regarded Group of Soldiers fighting the most difficult battles involving Canadians since the Korean War. It is common

knowledge in military circles that the coming months in theatre will be particularly challenging. The political situation in Afghanistan with the upcoming elections will create an explosive mixture that the Taliban will want to exploit.

The following members of 2 Fd have stepped forward and are flying out:

Serving with the Battle Group (Artillery component):

Lt Cairns: STA Tp, WO Fortin: CP Tech WO, MBdr Laporte: Gun Det 2I/C, Bdr Winter: CP Tech, Bdr Depar: Gun Number, Gnr Gagné-Michaud: Gun Number, Gnr Gagnon: Gun Number.

Serving with OMLT (Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team):

WO Moloughney OMLT Artillery Mentor (This will be WO Moloughney's second tour).

Serving with NSE (National Support Element)

CPL Kaddah: Contracts Clerk, Gnr Didone: Helicopter Load Rep.

Our thoughts will be with them.

Ubique, I remain, Your Observer

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Le Mot du Président/A Word from the President

À TOUS NOS MEMBRES ET ASSOCIES

Le printemps arrive, l'hiver tire à sa fin et graduellement nous commençons à penser aux beau mois de l'été. En réfléchissant sur les mois qui viennent de passer nous sommes fiers de dire que le Régiment a très bien fait lors de l'exercice Noble Guerrier au Camp Shelby aux États-Unis. Nos Artilleurs ont été félicités pour leurs niveaux de professionnalisme et de leurs performances.

Nous vous signalons aussi que les diners du premier vendredi du mois ont été suspendus pour les mois de février et mars à cause de l'hiver dur qui s'est abattu sur notre région qui empêchait la plus part de nos membres plus senior de sortir en sécurité. Les activités reprendrons au mois d'avril et nous considérons de remplacer ces mois d'hiver par les mois de juillet et aout. Plus de détails vous parviendrons sou peu.

Notre levé de fonds était un succès. Le gagnant des deux billets était Alain Lortie de Terrebonne, Québec. Le billet gagnant était vendu par un membre du 2 RAC. Nous disons merci à tous ceux qui ont participé.

Nous sommes fiers de vous informer que le Col Pierre Fecteau à été confirmé comme Col Honoraire du Régiment et que le LCol Charles de Kovachich a aussi été confirmé comme LCol Honoraire du Régiment en remplacement du Col Fecteau.

Nous sommes fier de vous annoncez aussi que Sheldrake sera maintenant publier sur son site Web une innovation de premier plan pour les Artilleurs de Montréal.

En terminant je souhaite à vous et vos familles une très bonne saison estivale et on se reparle à l'automne.

Ubique
Donald Dussault, Major(R)
Président AAM

TO ALL OUR MEMBERS AND ASSOCIATES

Spring is arriving, winter is coming to an end and gradually we are starting to think about our beautiful summer months. However reflecting on the months that have just passed we are proud to report that the Regiment did very well at exercise "Noble Guerrier" at Camp Shelby in the United States. Our Gunners were commended for their level of professionalism and their performances.

We bring to your attention that the first Friday of the month luncheons were suspended because of the harsh winter conditions that prevailed on our region making it very difficult for our more senior members to venture out in security on the roads. The activities will resume for the month of April and we are considering replacing those winter months with the months of July and August. More details will be forthcoming your way in the near future.

Our fund raising event went very well. The winner of the two airline tickets was Alain Lortie of Terrebonne, Québec. The winning ticket was sold by a member of 2nd Field. We wish to thank all those who have participated.

We are proud to inform you that Col Pierre Fecteau has been confirmed as the Honorary Colonel of the Regiment and that LCol Charles de Kovachich has also been confirmed as Honorary LCol of the Regiment replacing Col Fecteau.

We are happy to announce also that Sheldrake as of this issue will publish on its own website. This is a first for the Montreal Gunners in the Artillery family.

In closing until I report again to you in the fall, I take the opportunity to wish you and your families a wonderful and safe summer.

Ubique
Donald Dussault (maj.ret)
President
AAM

Recent Activities of 3 BAM

Operation "Tuques Bleues" 2009

CTV news started their report of the 2009 version of the "Tuques Bleues" event with a picture of the 3 BAM 25-pdr and the phrase, "This year the organization took out the heavy artillery for their fund raising event". Once again, the Regiment left a positive impression on those Montreal citizens who value the preservation of the Mont Royal Park. We also provided "Les Amis de la Montagne", the organizers of the event, with enough marquis tents to offer shelter to over 700 snowshoe clad participants that later climbed the Mount Royal in order to raise funds for the preservation of the park.

Exceptionally this year, 3 BAM proposed to fire the round to announce the start of the snowshoe race and the "Tuques Bleues" enthusiastically agreed to have us on. The president of "Les Amis de la Montagne", Mr. Peter Howlett, became an eager participant as he was offered to fire that starting round. This was an exceptional event for Mr. Howlett, as he had never fired a howitzer before. He viewed the privilege to pull the trigger on this heritage artillery piece as an exceptional honor for him. What a way for the Regiment to make an impression on a collection of Montreal citizens in a typically gunner

manner.

Some of you may wonder what we are doing joining this organization for their annual winter fund raising event. The answer lies in the history of our unit and its link with the creation of the Mount Royal Park. In 1862, one of our officers, Maj. Stevenson, who was also a Montreal city alderman, took a few guns on top of the mountain to fire a salute to demonstrate to its citizens that the area could be accessible by horse and carriage. Many citizens then could not see any merit in preserving the mountain and without Maj. Stevenson's intervention the park today could very well be developed with condominiums or hotels. Maj. Stevenson was the battery commander of the 3rd Montreal Battery, our original unit. This is the link between us and the organization that today is committed to the preservation of the Mont Royal Park.

Although the organization "Les Amis de la Montagne" had been created in the early 1980's it was not until 2005 that we became involved with them. The watershed event was our 150th anniversary ball, which spurred us to contact them for involvement with our celebration that turned out to be a fund raising event. One of their governors became a sponsor and "Les amis" attended the ball with at least two tables of delegates. It is since then that we are now considered one of their partners for their annual event called "Les tuques bleues".

This year is the first year that 3 BAM was involved in firing the starting shot for the snowshoe race. This involvement was very well received by all the Montreal citizens in attendance and we are certain to receive a "repeat" invitation. Congratulations go out to the Regiment again for providing the much needed marquis tents and for 3 BAM ! This new battery is demonstrating its function as a promotional medium to showcase the 2nd Field Regiment to Montreal citizens. This goes hand in hand with all the recruiting efforts of our unit.



Voici les participants, de Gauche à droite:
Rangée avant : Adjudant Gilles Aubé, MMM, CD, (retraité),
Soldat Didier Dupuy, HLCOL C. De Kovachich, CD,
Dr Andrew Gregory, Adjudant Michel Lepage CD, (retraité).
Rangée arrière: Artilleur Victor Roy-Maurice, Soldat Raoul Sandoval.
Absent de la photo : M. Stephen Gregory et l'Adjudant Gilles Pelletier, CD

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Recent Activities of 3 BAM (Cont'd)

Operation "Tuques Bleues" 2009 (Cont'd)

(Suite de la page 3)

The battery is comprised of the following personnel. Detachment leader, CWO Gilles Aubé MMM, CD (ret'd). Detachment members, Dr. Andrew Gregory, Mr. Steven Gregory, WO Michel Lepage, CD (ret'd), WO Gilles Pelletier, CD (ret'd), Gnr Roy-Maurice, Pte Dupuy and Pte Sandovale.

Honorable mention goes out to HCol Pierre Fecteau for attending the event with family members and friends. We can vouch for the HCol's physical fitness, as he too clad those snowshoes and climbed the mountain with all other participants.

Good shooting to the detachment! A job well done by all!

St-Patrick's Day Parade 2009



Saluting the reviewing officer from the turret of the gun tractor is Charles de Kovachich. Walking beside the gun tractor and saluting is Gilles Aubé.

Three on a Match

By Howard Stutt

The title refers to an expression often heard during WW1. If you lit a match while in the front lines it alerted any enemy sniper in the area. If a second soldier used the match to light his cigarette it allowed the sniper to take aim. If a third soldier tried to use the match he was a dead man. Our three anecdotes took place at Summer Camp at Petawawa. However, all have happy endings.

TARGET ROUND

Summer Camp at Petawawa and the regiments had their best troops ready for the annual competition. The guns pulled into RBVs near the firing point and the OP parties gathered at the block house at Trig G. It seemed that every CO, 2 i/c and Battery Commander felt it necessary to be at the OP as well. The splinter proof was very crowded and several regimental groups found comfortable places outside in the sunshine.

Shortly before the competition began the CO of one of the Quebec City units called everyone into the splinter-proof. Lt. Col. Dick Connor called back that it was too crowded there and

he would wait outside. The other Colonel answered by saying, "I am senior to you and I order you to come inside." This they did. About five minutes later a 25-pdr round landed within a few feet of where they had been sitting. They lived to tell the tale but what had gone wrong?

One of troops feeling that they could use all the practice they could get had put their guns into action in their RV area. With no real target to present someone picked a spot on the map—Trig G. One of the gun crews did not get the message and loaded and fired a live round.

ALL CATS ARE ALIKE IN THE DARK

Major George Aldous (later B Gen) loved Bren Gun Carriers. He had been trained as a Gunner Officer but at the passing out parade for his advanced course in England he, along with all officers from A-M were told that they had been reclassified as Infantry would take a short course immediately. Thus George became a platoon commander in the Winnipeg Rifles. Later he found himself wounded but

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the only officer standing in his company. He took over the company during the remainder of the battle. For this he was awarded the MC and command of the Carrier Platoon.

On this day at Petawawa he had nothing special to do and found himself a carrier. Before firing was to commence he checked with the Range Safety Officer and was given permission to drive down the range, through some trees and onto the highway. The Safety Officer at the other end of his route would pass the "All-Clear" when he was out of danger. Some hours later a very upset Major Aldous turned up in the regimental lines. He had been caught under fire while driving through the woods. He had crawled under his carrier and remained there for some time. He was unhurt but shaken up by the incident. What had gone wrong?

George had followed all the proper precautions. However, unknown to the Safety Officers there was another carrier in the area. When that carrier arrived in the safe area the all-clear was passed back to the gun positions.

ALLS WELL THAT ENDS WELL

Capt Tony Barrow also liked carriers. One day he was climbing into one and he slipped and fell heavily onto the metal side plate with his legs straddling the metal side plating. Blood and pain and a trip to the hospital followed. That evening a group of his friends walked over to the hospital to see how he was doing. After much teasing he was persuaded to remove the blankets and show us his wounds. He was well bandaged although some blood could still be seen.

One of his friends asked, "Tony, you are getting married on Saturday. What are you going to do?" What could he do?

After pondering the question for a very short time Tony replied that he would tell his wife-to-be, "Look dear, you can tell that it has not been used. It is not even unwrapped."

Some years ago I reminded Tony about the incident. He professed no knowledge of his clever quip. I did not ask him how he enjoyed the wedding.

Harper spoke the truth

Terry Liston, National Post Published: Friday, March 06, 2009

As the bodies of three more Canadian soldiers arrive back home, Prime Minister Harper's statement on CNN that the Taliban in Afghanistan cannot be defeated has generated outrage among Canadians of all political stripes. By contrast, Canadian soldiers patrolling the Pashtun grape fields and compounds may for the first time be sensing that their government finally understands the situation in Afghanistan.

Their war is not combat against a conventional army. They know that they cannot chase down and kill every Pashtun Taliban rebel in the country, which is larger than Manitoba. And there are even more in Pakistan. They know that for every Pashtun that is killed by NATO forces, another 10 young men are sent from his tribe to avenge him.

Western armies have recently agreed on how to overcome an insurgency. The consensus is based in large part on the British success in Ireland and Malaya, and the lessons drawn by the French and U. S. from their failures in North Africa and Vietnam, respectively. It has been validated by the rapid turn-around of the Sunni insurgency in Iraq under U. S. General David Petraeus.

The British experience in Northern Ireland is revealing. During 38 years of "troubles," the British army never defeated the IRA. Its closing report on the campaign emphasized that "the Army did not 'win' in any recognizable way; rather ... it allowed a political process to be established without unacceptable levels of intimidation." When the military campaign ended in 2007, a political solution had been reached. Both sides had concluded that fighting, alone, could not deliver the crushing victory they wanted and the world consequently saw the previously unimaginable spectacle of the Reverend Ian Paisley shaking hands with Sinn Fein president Gerry Adams.

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Harper spoke the truth(Cont'd)

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The recently published U. S. Army and Marine Corps counterinsurgency field manual (FM3-24) similarly emphasizes that the top priority is not the destruction of the enemy. Rather, "securing the civilian" is the most important part of the Army's mission. The manual emphasizes the critical role of politics and politicians at all levels, noting that "political leadership may ultimately deliver a negotiated solution to aspects of the conflict or to the insurgency itself." In addition, nation-building activity, carried out by civilian agencies, is identified as a key priority.

General Petraeus, author of the U. S. manual, victor in Iraq and now commander of all U. S. forces in the Middle East (including Central Asia), spoke to the Munich Conference on Security Policy on Feb. 8. He told world leaders and diplomats that there is no purely military solution in Afghanistan. True, he called for a short-term surge of forces to stop the current downward spiral of instability, but he did not talk of winning the war, nor of victory over the Taliban. Consistent with his counterinsurgency doctrine, he said: "Together with our Afghan partners, we have to work to provide the people security, to give them respect, to gain their support and to facilitate the provision of basic services."

He re-emphasized the fundamental principles of counterinsurgency doctrine: "clearing communities of Taliban and other extremist groups, working with Afghan security forces to prevent militants from returning, extending humanitarian aid and reconstruction assistance to local residents and helping Afghans build effective institutions capable of assuming full responsibility for security and governance." He also said that NATO forces must recommit to supporting the Afghan government in political reconciliation.

Mr. Harper's statements on CNN are consistent with this counterinsurgency approach. They reflect for the first time an honest statement of the military challenge facing our brave young soldiers in Afghanistan. He might have emphasized that the "end-state" for which 111 of our finest

young men and women have died also requires intense nation-building and energetic diplomacy to achieve reconciliation within Afghanistan as well as with its neighbours. But, it's an encouraging start.

Major-General (ret'd) Terry Liston was formerly the head

Ex Noble Guerrier 09

**Pte D. H. Chafe
Driver 7th Bty
2 Fd Regt, Montreal**

During the period of the 3rd to the 11th of January 09, reservists from the 34th and 35th Canadian Brigade Groups (CBG) of the Land Force Quebec Area took part in the militia concentration exercise "EX NOBLE GUERRIER 09" in Camp Shelby, Mississippi.

The exercise was fictionally set in the rugged mountainous terrain of Kandahar province where the goal was to train reservists in an asymmetrical environment emphasizing elements of the three block war which are commonly seen by soldiers deployed in Afghanistan.

A total of 1800 reservists participated on this exercise including 159 gunners from the three reserve artillery units in Québec; 2 RCA, 6 RCA and 62 RCA. The combined artillery Regiment under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Bourque (former Commanding Officer of 2nd Field Regiment) was made up of two batteries of four 105mm Howitzer guns.

During the exercise, the Regiment fired a total of 2020 rounds including high explosive rounds, air-burst proximity rounds, smoke rounds and illuminating rounds. The 105mm Howitzer has range of 11,200 metres and a blast radius of 30m per round. Highlights of the exercise included attaching forward observation officers with the infantry to provide indirect fire expertise during company level attacks, conducting local defense of a Battery position against enemy forces and the performance of direct fire missions under the command of gun detachment commanders.

Throughout the exercise, all members of the combined Regiment maintained a furious tempo and completed all their training

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Ex Noble Guerrier 09 (Cont'd)

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objectives. The CCmdt of 34 CBG, Col Lapointe, complemented the professionalism and the skill demonstrated by the members of the combined Regiment.

The training in Mississippi greatly benefited the members of the combined Regiment and helped hone their skills which will be useful during future exercises and deployments.



Treading Lightly

By Jules Crittenden

<http://www.julescrittenden.com/2009/01/12/treading-lightly/>

A Canadian Army Journal report* on the use of armor in counterinsurgency, by two-tour Afghan vet Maj. Trevor Cadieu, Lord Strathcona's Horse.

By deploying tanks and armoured engineers to Afghanistan in October 2006 and supporting the acquisition of the Leopard 2, the leadership of the Canadian Forces (CF) has acknowledged the importance of maintaining heavy armour in a balanced force. While the continued development of sensors and technology will be extremely important to achieving improved situational awareness (SA) on the battlefield, the hard-earned experiences of the Canadian Army and our allies in sustained combat in Afghanistan and have proven we must be prepared to get our hands dirty and come into physical contact with the enemy if we wish to define their strength, composition and intentions and subsequently kill them. Canadian tanks and armoured engineers have better protected our dismounted infantry soldiers in Southern Afghanistan, allowing them to close with and destroy a fanatical and determined enemy in extremely complex terrain.

This article will review tactical lessons learned of Canadian armour in Afghanistan since October 2006, provide a candid assessment of the challenges faced by tankers in this counter-insurgency (COIN) environment, and consider the introduction of the Leopard 2. Nowhere in this editorial is it implied that Canadian armour is the predominate arm, or that it should be reinvigorated at the expense of other battlefield enablers. On the contrary, our recent experience in combat has provided irrefutable evidence that all elements of the combined arms team remain fundamental to the delivery of decisive combat power in the contemporary operating environment (COE), and that our efforts in training and operations should reinforce this grouping.

1st Battalion Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry Battle Group (1 PPCLI BG) was

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Tread Lightly (Cont'd)

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confronted in the spring of 2006 with a significant increase in insurgent activity in the Panjwayi and Zhari Districts of Kandahar Province. Although the Canadian BG working closely with the Afghan National Army (ANA) was able to disrupt the enemy in a series of BG-level operations culminating in Operation ZAHAR (as part of Operation MOUNTAIN THRUST), Taliban forces quickly re-asserted their presence in the region once hostilities had ended. The International Stabilization Assistance Force (ISAF) could not ignore the threat posed by this massing of insurgents on the doorstep of Kandahar City, the coalition centre of gravity in the south of Afghanistan. A significant information operations (Info Ops) victory would be awarded to the Taliban if they could not be dislodged from these areas, and the ability of the International Stabilization Assistance Force (ISAF) to achieve its stated mission of reconstruction would be virtually impossible to achieve without the confidence and support of the local populace. Within weeks of arriving in theatre in August 2006, the 1st Battalion The Royal Canadian Regiment (1 RCR) BG was tasked to clear the Taliban from Panjwayi and Zhari Districts in Operation MEDUSA, the largest combat action undertaken to date by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Rather than adhering to small unit attacks and ambushes, and retreating in the face of direct confrontation with NATO forces, the Taliban chose to make a conventional stand at Pashmul. They occupied well dug-in defensive positions amongst densely packed grape and poppy fields and they covered with direct fire and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) all ingress routes suitable for wheeled vehicles. The BG Commanding Officer (CO), Lieutenant-Colonel Omer Lavoie, realized quickly that restoring tactical battlefield mobility would be essential to dislodging the enemy from this complex terrain. Without armour at his disposal, he introduced civilian-pattern tracked dozers to the fight in order to slice through grape fields and allow dismounted infantry soldiers to get "up close and personal" with the insurgents. The tactic

was extremely effective. Advancing under the cover of heavy artillery and aerial bombardment, the dozers allowed the BG to seize key terrain and facilitate the systematic clearance by dismounted soldiers of all compounds and infrastructure. By 13 September 2006, Taliban forces operating in Pashmul and Zhari had capitulated. Hundreds of insurgents had been killed and many others were forced to flee to the west.

While two successive infantry-heavy Canadian BGs conducted successful counterinsurgency operations for nearly nine months without integral armour, the lessons of Operation MEDUSA reinforced the importance of retaining all combat enablers in full spectrum operations. According to Lieutenant-Colonel Lavoie, "If you'd asked me five months ago, 'do you need tanks to fight insurgents?' I would have said, 'No, you're nuts.'" He added, "Because [the Taliban] are acting conventionally, then conventional assets like tanks, armoured engineering vehicles, and armoured bridge-laying vehicles certainly have their place here."

...

Company 2 PPCLI and the ANA in a series of offensive operations aimed at expanding the BG's security zone. Conducting several complex deliberate breaching and cordon and search operations in Zhari District, the ANA and Canadians demonstrated clearly their capacity and resolve to go after the Taliban at a time and place of their choosing. After securing the Siah Choy area with the ANA, the tank squadron united with American Special Operations Forces (SOF) and the Canadian Reconnaissance Squadron to dominate the Dowrey-Arghandab peninsula, keeping the enemy off balance in the region. Following the transition of command authority to 2 RCR, B Squadron remained in theatre for nearly a month conducting disruption operations along the Helmand-Kandahar provincial border and reinforcing Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in contact with insurgents in Howz-e-Madad and Sangsar. While sub-unit integrity was maintained for specific missions, B Squadron was tasked as a steady state to support two

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different operations concurrently: the squadron minus (two troops of four tanks and the squadron headquarters) usually formed a combat team with A Company, while the third tank troop was detached to another sub-unit elsewhere in the AO. Tanks never worked independently and the value of the combined arms team was evident. The tank squadron commander led routinely during the advance and break-in phases of operations, while infantry company commanders naturally retained control of the fight through/clearance and consolidation phases.

The article goes on to address criticism of the use of armour, saying warnings that armour would increase civilian casualties was not only untrue, they think it helped reduce civilian casualties by increasing on-the-ground direct

Lives lost, lessons learned

By **GLORIA GALLOWAY** From Monday's Globe and Mail February 26, 2007

Five years ago this month, the first Canadian soldiers arrived in Afghanistan to begin their first real combat mission in decades. The deployment came after nearly 10 years of cuts by a federal government that was more focused on deficit reduction than military expansion. As they grappled with the transition from peacekeeping to conventional warfare, the Canadian Forces have learned many hard lessons, particularly about the state and capabilities of its equipment.

Lesson No. 1. Transport

The problem: People and supplies must travel far from their base camps over dangerous roads to reach the outposts where Canadians patrol. The Taliban know that trucks heading to the front will eventually return, setting a perfect stage for an ambush. So Canada, which has no heavy-lift helicopters in the theatre, must borrow rides from allies such as the Americans and Dutch.

The solution: The federal government is spending \$2.7-billion to buy and maintain 16 Chinook helicopters and has requested urgent

delivery because they are deemed so essential to the Afghan mission. That is a huge change since 1992, when Chinooks were declared unnecessary after the collapse of the Soviet Union and Canada sold its fleet of 12 to the Dutch for \$2.25-million apiece. (The military won't confirm if those helicopters are the same ones currently being borrowed to ferry Canadians in Kandahar.) In the meantime, Canada has been relying on an aging fleet of Hercules cargo planes that require many hours of maintenance to stay airworthy. Canada is perhaps the only country in Afghanistan that supplies its troops with a manoeuvre called a low-altitude parachute extraction drop. The Hercules skims several metres above the ground with its rear door open and the cargo, attached to a parachute, is pushed out.

Lesson No. 2. Jeep patrols

The problem: The first Canadian troops in Afghanistan patrolled the streets of Kabul in Iltis jeeps, a military variant of a commercial vehicle with little protective reinforcement. Military commanders boasted that, because the jeeps were not heavily protected, they projected an image of confidence in the region's stability. In October, 2003, two Canadians were killed when their Iltis hit an anti-tank mine. Less than four months later, another soldier was killed when a suicide bomber jumped on the hood of the Iltis in which he was riding.

The solution: The Iltises were replaced by the armour-plated G-Wagons. The G-Wagon was a quantum leap over the Iltis, but some analysts say it still doesn't provide the protection required against suicide bombers and land mines. Canada has also sent over light-armoured vehicles, or LAV-III's. But even the original LAVs were not reinforced to the standard required in Afghanistan, so the armour has been bolstered to give them added protection. They can move very fast over difficult roads and troops love them. But they have, on occasion, tipped over. In March, 2006, a LAV-III was hit by a taxi and toppled off the road, killing one soldier. It is not completely bombproof or mineproof. And soldiers require

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Lives lost, lessons learned (Cont'd)

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large amounts of training to use them effectively.

Lesson No. 3. Tanks

The problem: Through the 1990s, the Canadian military questioned the usefulness of tanks. The lumbering machines were of little value in peacekeeping operations and most experts felt future wars would not be land combats. Tanks may be expensive, difficult to maintain and hard on gas supplies, but in Afghanistan, the military needed armoured protection capable of driving over rutted fields and plowing over walls. And it needed serious firepower.

The solution: Canada sent 15 Leopard tanks to the war zone this past September. Tanks are imposing symbols of power. While the Leopards are not meant for long-range fire, they can punch a hole in a mud-walled compound from 500 metres away. Canada also thought its M113 troop carriers were outdated even though about one-third of them had been lengthened and strengthened in the late 1990s. In Afghanistan, the large, boxy, tracked vehicle is an excellent means of getting soldiers to (and through) villages that may be Taliban haunts. When Canadian troops battle an enemy that lives in what amounts to a medieval society, they have learned that old-fashioned weapons have a place.

Lesson No. 4. Reconnaissance

The problem: In 2002, Canada had no easy way of monitoring the movement of the Taliban, who could hide in compounds and congregate in locations that were beyond the soldiers' easy watch.

The solution: Canada bought drones: remote-controlled miniature flying platforms for surveillance systems. At first, they didn't work very well. Several crashed on landing or on takeoff. Today, they are critical tools for gaining information in an urban war zone because they can fly over buildings and look behind walls, bringing back risk-free

reconnaissance. They are also hard to hit from the ground and provide excellent imagery. In addition, the Canadian military makes much use of its Coyotes, reconnaissance and intelligence vehicles that one analyst describes as being worth their weight in gold. Their surveillance systems are designed to detect hostile forces using a combination of cameras, radar, thermal imaging and laser range-finding equipment.

Lesson No. 5. Tracking the enemy

The problem: Regardless of how much state-of-the-art equipment Canada sends to Afghanistan, the Taliban has found ways to defeat it. The enemy knows its way around the country in a way that Canadian troops never will. Checkpoints have been passed by old men on bikes who turned out to be suicide bombers.

The solution: Western armies use satellite images to pinpoint the enemy. But they have also learned that, when fighting an insurgency, some old-fashioned techniques work best. In Afghanistan, many military experts argue that the best way to determine an enemy's location is to keep going until the Taliban start to shoot. But Western armies maintain superiority after sundown because the NATO allies, including Canada, are far ahead of the Taliban when it comes to night-vision equipment. In the air, the Americans have much improved their night-sight capabilities since 2002, when they accidentally bombed Canadians taking part in an after-dark training exercise, killing four soldiers. And on the ground, Canadian troops can see movement at night from 1,500 metres away using specially equipped goggles.

Lesson No. 6. Artillery

The problem: Just as Western countries believed that tanks were no longer useful, so too were conventional guns deemed outdated. That type of thinking led Canada to get rid of its 155-mm, self-propelled M109 howitzers -- large, easily transportable guns that can hit targets up to 30 kilometres away. But then came Afghanistan and the realization that on treeless terrain, where troops are exposed,

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NATO Celebrates its 60th Birthday

Howard Stutt recently sent me a newspaper from his archives. The name of the newspaper is "Defence Canada, The Military Newspaper of Canada's Reserve Army". It was published in Montreal in March 1949.

In reading the Defence Canada newspaper, I realized that the publication date coincided with the founding of NATO.

Here briefly are some key events and dates:

Berlin Blockade from 24 June 1948 to 11 May 1949

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)/*Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord (OTAN)*, also called the *(North) Atlantic Alliance*, is established by the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on 4 April 1949. The founding members of NATO are: Canada; United States; United Kingdom; Belgium; Denmark; France; Iceland; Italy; Luxemburg; Netherlands; Norway; and Portugal.

The Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) is established on 23 May 1949

The Korean War starts June 1950

Canadian Brigade sent to NATO Nov 1951

The German Army is created in 1955

Germany joins NATO in 1955

The Warsaw Pact, the Soviet-sponsored

military-treaty organization and the European Communist Bloc's counterpart to NATO is created in Warsaw, Poland on May 14, 1955.

The Newspaper Article from Defence Canada

Montreal Youth (Cont'd)

(Continued from page 12)

entertain their friends off duty or on special nights set aside for this purpose.

Accent on Youth!

The new reserve army is essentially a young man's army and is to be staffed by young men for young men. Since the finish of the last war three years ago, extreme changes have been introduced whereby the officers and training personnel have been chosen with a positive accent on youth. Senior officers and NCOs are mostly men who have conducted themselves with valour during the past war and who are still young enough to put the necessary pep into the proceedings of their respective units. The modern youth need have no qualms about the calibre of these new officers. They will find them all regular men ready to do a big job towards providing Canada with a reserve force that will be a credit to everyone concerned.

Lives lost, lessons learned (Cont'd)

(Continued from page 10)

that kind of firepower would be extremely useful.

The solution: New types of artillery, called M777s, were ordered post-haste. They are extremely accurate, can be used with GPS-guided shells and have excellent range and reliability. They are a good negotiation tool; in trying to persuade Afghans not to help the Taliban, Canadians can demonstrate the consequences of bad behaviour by radioing to a launcher many kilometres away, and suddenly the Afghan farmer is left with a large hole in

his field and a new appreciation of NATO firepower. Then there is the P90, a handheld submachine gun with a needle-nosed bullet that cuts through body armour that has proven its worth in tight spaces, like the close walls of an Afghan compound. It has been in use since 1994 but has proven much more valuable in combat situations than on peacekeeping tours. All kinds of firepower are useful in modern-day conventional warfare of the type being fought in Afghanistan.

This material was filed with the assistance of David Bercuson, director of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary; Alexander Moens, who teaches international relations at the Simon Fraser University; Wesley Wark, a security expert at the

Montreal Youth Now Offered Training With "The Gunners"

Published in "Defence Canada" March 1949

Most people reading this article are firm believers in insurance of some kind; a lot of our readers undoubtedly have taken out large amounts and diversified types of policies. We can say that Canada is an insurance-minded nation, speaking of insurance in the normal way, and yet, when it comes to insuring our country against possible wars, we as other democratic countries in the world, are loath to even think about insurance let alone buy it at some personal sacrifice.

We are now, of course, speaking of insurance of another kind; by insurance we mean Armed Forces and a Defence System of sufficient strength to ensure that our opponents would think twice before picking a fight with us. Had the Allies been equipped with such Forces in the years preceding 1914 and 1939 World Wars I and II would probably not have occurred.

International relationships today are as tense as they ever were in 1914 and 1939, short of the existence of a state of war, and yet the average man in the street appears to be quite unconcerned regarding his future. If war were to break out tomorrow there is no doubt that he would make terrific sacrifices for his country, as he always has in the past.

But we don't want another war. Those who have seen what the ravages of total war can mean to a country, and who realize that Canada would not enjoy the same immunity in World War III, as she has heretofore, should explain to their younger friends what war means and how it can best be avoided.

The only hope of avoiding another war is for the freedom-loving countries to build up and maintain their Armed Forces to the point where a quick enemy victory is denied. England, the United States, and others, realize this and are doing their utmost now to build up their strengths. They have

instituted peacetime conscription, in most cases, for the first time in their histories. They have finally decided to buy insurance in a big way.

But are we in Canada doing our utmost? Are we pulling our weight in the international boat. We have no conscription and our Armed Forces, Active and Reserve, are considerably below authorized strength.

Let's be realistic about this. If we are to avoid war we must make some effort and sacrifice now. If we don't want to join the Active Force we can contribute our share by joining the Reserve Force, which only means one night a week during the winter and one week at camp in the summer. Surely giving up this small amount of spare time is cheap insurance.

And the employer must play his part too. He must first of all encourage you to join a local Reserve Unit and then he should allow you extra time off for the week at summer camp.

Elsewhere in this paper you will see what the Reserve Army can do for you in the way of improved health, happiness and education, and not forgetting an increased income.

Think all this over seriously and conscientiously, and when you have decided, don't forget "the Gunners."

Uniforms Provided Free

A far cry from the pre-war days (when units often had to supply the reservist with many pieces of uniform, boots, etc., from the funds of the regiment) is that all uniforms and accessories are provided for the Reserve Army.

Each unit is staffed by a Regular Army Officer and two or more senior NCO's known as the A&T Staff (Administrative and Training Staff) who act in an advisory capacity, imparting special knowledge and latest information to all ranks.

Officers, sergeants and men each have their own recreation rooms, where they may

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Further Memories of 2nd Field at War

By Charles Hunter

Further to some of my experiences with the 2nd. Field Regiment during the hostilities. I deliberately stayed away from some of the more gory detail, only mentioning a couple that concerned some good friends. As a result it looked as if we had a pretty easy time of it. This is to correct that impression. I managed to secure a few pages from the Regimental Diary. These were kept by the Regiment at the time of action. A record was kept on a daily basis of all pertinent events. This is a true and accurate copy of events during the month of September, 1944.

- Sept 2 Moved again at 17.40 hrs. In action at 19.30 hrs. Enemy retreating rapidly. By nightfall we are out of range.
- Sept 3 Moved to new positions.
- Sept 4 Enemy resistance increasing near Rimini. Regimental FOO vehicle hit. Driver killed.
- Sept 5 Heavy bombing in the Regimental area during the night with anti-personnel bombs. Two 8th Battery men killed, one 10th Battery man wounded.
- Sept 6 Opposition strong all along division front 4,000 rounds were fired between 1600 hrs and 2000 hrs. Feverish action again at 0130 hrs.
- Sept 7 Various targets fired during the day. Harassing fire all night.
- Sept 8 Fairly quiet. Greek Mountain Brigade relieved by 3CIB.
- Sept 9 Regimental area bombed during the night and heavily shelled at 0130 hrs. by 17cm. and 88mm. guns. Only two gunners and four vehicles were casualties.
- Sept 10 Enemy dropped anti-personnel bombs during the night. No casualties. Support Greek Brigade during enemy counterattack. Drove them off.
- Sept 11 Moved off at 1100 hrs. In action at 1215 hrs. 2200 rounds of H.E. and 2,000 of smoke dumped on Regimental position. Enemy shelled position all night.
- Sept 12 Quiet. Restriction of 5 rounds per gun. 150 rounds of propaganda shells fired, Heavy shelling of our area all night.
- Sept 13 At 0030 hrs 8th. Battery reported hit on ammunition in gun pit. Fire was put out quickly but 200 rounds were useless. At 0050 hrs. 8th Battery reported shell landing in front of gun pit. It failed to explode, but caved the pit in on the gun. Immediate digging out and repairs had the gun ready for action two minutes before barrage was supposed to start. Ten minutes later, 7th. Battery reported direct hit on Sgt. Underhill's gun. Underhill and Bdr. Marshal killed. gunner evacuated. At 0115 10th. Battery reported hit on Sgt. Newcombe's gun. Three wounded, one killed. A smoke screen was fired for the British 4th. Division.
- Sept 14 Supported British division. They stopped 2000 yds short of their objective.
- Sept 15 Troop Battery targets were engaged all through the day. Moved forward at 2300 hrs.
- Sept 16 Regiment in action at 0230 hrs. Firing all day in support of 1CIB. At 2300 hrs. enemy counter-attacked. Broken up with intensive firing from our guns.
- Sept 17 Supported British 4th. Division on our left flank. Then heavily supported RCR and 48th. Highlanders of 1CIB.
- Sept 18 Supported infantry attacks all day. At night they brought in searchlights to light up the front. The infantry would now be attacking 24 hrs a day.
- Sept 19 Firing all day. 8th Battery fired a smoke screen.
- Sept 20 Searchlights again. Attack went in at 1300 hrs. Heavy rain from 1400 hrs.
- Sept 21 Moving forward. All guns have to be winched out onto the road. Heavy rain continues. Started at 0330 hrs. In action at new position by 0700 hrs. Brig. Zeigler (CRA) came and congratulated the Regiment on their part in the recent operations. Still

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Bataillons Territoriaux, La Voie De L'Avenir?

Sergent Kurt Grant

From the Canadian Army Journal Volume 11.2 Summer 2008

Le temps est venu de créer des régiments provinciaux de blindés, d'artillerie et d'infanterie concordant avec un effectif de la taille de deux corps. [...] Le problème, c'est que, ce faisant, on attaque de plein fouet le système régimentaire et qu'il y aura donc des pleurs, des grincements de dents et des pressions politiques. [...] Mieux vaut affronter la tourmente dès maintenant et faire les réformes nécessaires.

Major-général Christopher Vokes 1952

Introduction

Depuis la parution en mai 2005 de l'énoncé de politique internationale du Canada intitulé *Fierté et influence : notre rôle dans le monde*, la question du rôle qui doit échoir à la Milice en cas de crise nationale a fait couler beaucoup d'encre. Comme on pouvait s'y attendre, la Force régulière a son point de vue, et la Milice a le sien, comme quoi plus ça change... Si les relations entre la Milice et la Force régulière ont parfois été houleuses, on observe une sorte de trêve depuis les événements du 11 Septembre, les deux s'étant cantonnées dans leurs rôles défensifs respectifs. La Force régulière est considérée comme l'équipe «internationale» qui approvisionne en bataillons les missions à l'étranger, tandis que la Milice constitue l'équipe «nationale», qui fournit les troupes d'appoint.

Mais les temps changent. L'avènement du terrorisme mondial et la reconnaissance du fait que les cibles terroristes débordent le cadre du champ de bataille obligent tout le monde à un nouveau constat. Ainsi, le fait que la Force régulière compte sur les troupes d'appoint de la Milice a pour effet de détendre les relations entre les deux en favorisant le dialogue.

Il n'empêche que quinze ans passés à se consacrer principalement à l'envoi de

contingents à l'étranger n'est pas sans mettre à mal la protection du pays. Qui interviendra en cas de crise à l'intérieur de nos frontières? Dans le passé, c'était officiellement le rôle de la Milice. Mais l'histoire a montré que c'était la Force régulière qui intervenait d'abord, bien qu'avec d'importantes troupes d'appoint de la Milice.

Tout cela soulève la question du cloisonnement des rôles. En l'absence de limite avant de la zone de bataille (LAZB), l'important est de mettre en action une force entraînée et rapidement mobilisable. Mais la Force régulière ne peut pas tout faire. Comme elle est déjà gravement en manque d'effectifs, il semble bien que le nouveau rôle de bataillon territorial soit fait sur mesure pour la Milice.

L'énoncé de politique de 2005 parle de la création de quatre nouveaux bataillons de réaction rapide de la Force régulière appuyés par une capacité d'intervention territoriale dans douze villes du pays. Tout porte à croire que cette capacité d'intervention sera une responsabilité de la Milice, quoique rien ne soit officiel. Pour répondre à ce besoin, «la Force terrestre examinera la structure actuelle des unités de la Réserve pour chacun des emplacements mentionnés en vue de regrouper ou d'amalgamer certaines de ces unités s'il y a lieu». Mais ce projet n'a pas fait l'objet de beaucoup d'autres commentaires.

Comme il n'y a aucun plan clairement énoncé, la rumeur va bon train. Il s'agit généralement de pures spéculations s'appuyant sur des bribes d'information et des conjectures. Toutefois, certains bruits sont également alimentés par la peur. En effet, la Milice se souvient encore de la première tentative de restructuration de la Réserve entamée à la fin des années 1990 et qui a suscité une profonde méfiance envers tout changement exécuté par voie institutionnelle sans consultation.

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Que la Première réserve doive se préparer à une transformation, c'est indéniable. La mise en place de bataillons territoriaux constitue une réponse logique à un besoin légitime. Toutefois, on peut déplorer un manque flagrant d'information, et l'ignorance est mère de la peur. C'est pourquoi, dans ce bref article, nous comptons examiner la question et proposer des moyens d'instituer des bataillons territoriaux sans s'encombrer d'un fardeau institutionnel indu. Nous espérons en outre que nos propos susciteront des échanges sur cette question.

Historique

Quand on parle de bataillons territoriaux, il importe de bien définir la notion. Un *bataillon territorial*, au sens où ce terme est utilisé au Canada et pour les besoins de notre article, est un bataillon constitué d'éléments recrutés à l'intérieur d'une région («territoire») du pays. Il a pour fonction d'intervenir en cas de catastrophe naturelle ou d'urgence d'une autre nature. On utilise parfois à tort l'expression *armée territoriale*, qui correspond en fait à l'expression britannique *territorial army*, qui désigne la milice là-bas. Au Royaume-Uni, la Territorial Army (TA) est la principale force de réserve de volontaires de l'armée, et elle est composée principalement de soldats à temps partiel, tout comme la Milice canadienne. Toute l'agitation entourant actuellement l'idée de bataillons territoriaux prend son origine dans le premier document d'orientation stratégique militaire du gouvernement conservateur rendu public en 2005. Ce document annonçait la création de «bataillons de défense territoriale» qui interviendraient en cas d'urgence nationale telle que catastrophe naturelle ou attentat terroriste.

Comme telle, et combinée à une longue liste de promesses de dépenses pour la défense, cette annonce semble mettre de l'avant une mesure rationnelle et pondérée pour réagir à l'enchaînement apparemment ininterrompu de catastrophes naturelles au pays et d'engagements à l'étranger. Toutefois, le document d'orientation stratégique, tout en annonçant la mise sur pied de ces bataillons,

n'en disait pas plus, et il ne s'est pas passé grand-chose depuis. Cela dit, la création de nouveaux bataillons constitue-t-elle vraiment une idée nouvelle, ou une idée ancienne présentée dans un nouvel emballage?

Ce n'est pas une idée nouvelle. Sans qu'on utilise exactement le terme *bataillons territoriaux*, l'idée de mettre sur pied des bataillons autour d'un corps de soldats réguliers remonte en fait aux débuts de l'histoire militaire canadienne. Durant la Guerre de 1812, par exemple, la Garnison de Prescott, sur les rives du Saint-Laurent, abritait une force régulière britannique d'environ 150 soldats. Elle a reçu comme troupes d'appoint deux compagnies de milice de 100 hommes chacune, appuyées par des milices des comtés de Stormont, Dundas, Glengarry et Leeds. Pour la bataille d'Ogdensburg, qui eut lieu en février 1813, le bataillon comptait environ 550 soldats. La constitution de bataillons à partir de milices locales est une pratique encore actuelle. Pour s'en convaincre, il suffit d'aller voir un exercice de brigade de fin de semaine, ou la concentration annuelle d'été, pour voir comment les membres de différentes unités sont regroupées pour former des compagnies de combat.

Cette pratique a été modifiée durant la Première Guerre mondiale. Au lieu d'envoyer des régiments formés, le Canada a décidé de mettre sur pied des «bataillons de volontaires» issus d'un «territoire» ou d'une «région» du pays, créant ainsi essentiellement des bataillons territoriaux. De fait, le Canada n'enverra pas moins de 250 bataillons de ce genre. Mentionnons toutefois que la taille du «territoire» variait avec les missions. Par exemple, pour la guerre des Boers, les recrues venaient des quatre coins du Canada, tandis que pour les missions subséquentes, les bassins de recrutement étaient plus restreints, se limitant parfois au comté ou au *township*. En fait, si l'on excepte la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, on peut dire que la mise sur pied de bataillons composés de soldats provenant d'une région donnée constituait la formule privilégiée par le Canada pour remplir ses missions intérieures et extérieures. C'était un

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Bataillons Territoriaux, La Voie De L'Avenir? (Suite)

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peu la «manière canadienne» de faire la guerre, si l'on veut.

Après la guerre de Corée, l'avènement des armes nucléaires tactiques change le visage de la guerre sur toute la planète. En réaction à cette situation nouvelle, le Canada délaisse la formule du bataillon de volontaires. En prévision d'un engagement «précipité», il le remplace par des forces régulières permanentes stationnées en Europe. La Milice, qui a constitué pendant longtemps la première force militaire du Canada, se sent trahie par cette nouvelle importance accordée à la Force régulière. Ce sentiment s'aggrave lorsque l'on constate, à la fin des années 1950, que le gouvernement a l'intention, dans le cadre d'un programme de «survie nationale», de donner à la Milice un nouveau rôle d'équipe de nettoyage en cas de guerre nucléaire.

Bien que ce projet soit resté lettre morte, les retombées des rapports Kennedy et Anderson mettent en évidence une réalité désormais incontournable, à savoir que l'approche du Canada relativement à ses forces armées est sur le point de changer. Avec les «dividendes de la paix» promis pour la première fois dans le Livre blanc sur la défense de 1964, combinés à l'unification de la Force régulière, il devient de plus en plus évident que les affaires militaires vont devoir céder le pas aux enjeux sociaux. Certes, au niveau opérationnel, les FC s'entraînaient avec les forces alliées en prévision de guerres nucléaires et classiques, mais dans les hautes sphères politiques, on considérait généralement que cette activité avait surtout pour but de permettre à Ottawa de rester «dans la confrérie». De manière générale, cette vision de la politique de défense jouira d'un vaste appui populaire tout au long de la guerre froide.

Les troupes d'appoint fournies par la Milice pour les exercices et les déploiements à l'étranger se sont réduites comme peau de chagrin pour finalement se mesurer en dizaines de soldats à peine. Après tout, les bataillons réguliers n'avaient-ils pas leurs

pleins effectifs? Pour faire participer des soldats de la Milice aux exercices, il fallait ne pas emmener tout le monde, ce que les membres de la Force régulière n'appréciaient guère. Le déclin graduel du financement de l'armée est arrivé à son comble lorsque, en 1987, on a cherché à augmenter l'efficacité des militaires sans leur consacrer plus de crédits. C'est dans cette optique que le gouvernement a tenté de ressusciter le concept de bataillon territorial avec la création du bataillon 10/90. Appelé concept de la «force totale», le bataillon 10/90 consistait à créer au sein de chaque régiment de la Force régulière une unité d'infanterie dont environ 10 pour 100 des effectifs étaient composés de soldats de la Force régulière à temps plein, tandis que les autres postes étaient pourvus par des soldats de la Réserve appartenant à des unités affiliées de la région. Le changement soudain de la dynamique planétaire survenu à la fin des années 1980 a certes joué un rôle majeur dans la désaffection dont a fait l'objet ce concept, mais il faut dire que cette formule n'a jamais vraiment eu la cote dans la Force régulière. En fait, privés des crédits et de l'équipement dont ils avaient besoin pour réussir, ces bataillons étaient condamnés dès le départ.

Avec la fin de la guerre froide et la désintégration du Rideau de fer, le rôle des FC semble des plus incertains. Le Canada se retire de l'Europe et «des compressions budgétaires obligent de plus en plus le Ministère à réduire ses frais généraux». Il reste à recentrer les efforts sur un rôle nouveau et apparemment moins coûteux : le maintien de la paix. Toutefois, ce rôle s'avère nettement plus complexe qu'on ne l'avait prévu. Alors que le Canada n'a jamais déployé plus de 2000 Casques bleus en même temps, ce nombre se met à grimper considérablement. Pour respecter ses engagements, la Force régulière opère une rotation semestrielle des bataillons régimentaires. Toutefois, le manque de personnel amène la Force régulière, sans qu'elle s'en rende compte, à ressusciter le concept de bataillon territorial en se mettant à

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compter sur un nombre sans cesse croissant de volontaires de la Milice pour pourvoir les postes d'exécution.

Si le Livre blanc sur la défense de 1994 valorisait l'existence de forces armées «aptes au combat», on a omis d'allouer les fonds nécessaires pour atteindre cet objectif. La succession des catastrophes naturelles de 1996 (Saguenay), 1997 (rivière Rouge) et 1998 (tempête de verglas) a mis la Force régulière dans une situation ardue : elle devait «faire la guerre» sur deux fronts.

Les leçons de la fin des années 1990 et le changement de paradigme planétaire, après le 11 Septembre, amèneront les FC à réexaminer leur rôle en se demandant dans quelle mesure elles sont aptes — aussi bien la Force régulière que la Réserve — à répondre aux besoins du Canada en matière de politique étrangère et intérieure. La parution en mai 2005 de l'énoncé de politique internationale du Canada intitulé *Fierté et influence : notre rôle dans le monde*, sans remplacer le Livre blanc de 1994 sur la défense, constitue la première étape importante de cette démarche et fait connaître la nouvelle vision du gouvernement en ce qui concerne les FC et le rôle que la Milice doit y jouer. Sous le grand thème de la «transformation», les FC s'engagent alors dans une réorganisation sans précédent depuis l'Unification de la fin des années 1960.

Pendant ce temps, les déploiements à l'étranger continuent de cadencer le programme de l'armée. Bien qu'il n'y ait aucune règle écrite, les instructions du CFT et du CEMD sont que «tout le monde» doit aller à l'étranger au moins une fois. Au cours des 15 dernières années, *renforcement* a été le mot d'ordre de la Milice, dont tout l'entraînement a porté sur la préparation des soldats à un déploiement à l'étranger. Cette orientation ne peut que poser la question de ce qui se passera en cas de crise intérieure.

Un des problèmes réside dans le fait qu'il subsiste encore beaucoup de confusion quant aux rôles de chacun en cas de catastrophe. Dans l'énoncé de politique de 2005, on tente de clarifier les choses en répartissant ainsi les

rôles de la Force régulière et des forces de réserve:

- **Attributions de l'Armée de terre.** «Formée de la Force régulière et de la Réserve (Milice), elle a pour principales fonctions de défendre la nation et, lorsqu'on fait appel à elle, de combattre et de vaincre en temps de guerre.»
- **Attributions de la Réserve.** «Au sein de l'Armée de terre, la Réserve (Milice) fournit le cadre de la mobilisation, sert de lien entre l'Armée et les Canadiens et permet le renforcement dans les Forces canadiennes.»

La Restructuration de la Réserve de la Force terrestre (RRFT) a fait ressortir encore davantage le fait que la structure de la Milice ne lui permettait pas de remplir son rôle. Toutefois, l'énoncé de politique reste muet sur le besoin implicite d'une «intervention locale» en cas d'urgence. L'armée a tenté de répondre à cette question lorsqu'elle a annoncé qu'avec la mise sur pied du Régiment d'opérations spéciales du Canada (ROSC), elle créerait «quatre nouveaux bataillons d'intervention rapide [...] stratégiquement [situés] à Comox, à Trenton, à Bagotville et à Goose Bay, afin d'assurer la présence de la Force régulière et une intervention efficace en cas de catastrophes naturelles ou d'attaques terroristes».

L'unité interarmées d'intervention du Canada (UIIC) «est l'une des quatre unités des forces d'opérations spéciales (FOS) du commandement des forces d'opérations spéciales du Canada (COMFOSCAN). L'UIIC est capable d'effectuer une grande variété d'opérations, notamment des opérations d'aide à des ministères du gouvernement fédéral et des opérations internationales de gestion d'urgences nucléaires, biologiques et chimiques (NBC). De plus, l'UIIC maintient une équipe d'intervention initiale dans un état de préparation très élevé dans le cadre de l'équipe nationale d'intervention en cas d'urgence nucléaire, biologique et chimique (EINBC), laquelle peut être déployée par voie terrestre ou aérienne.»

De plus, «afin de réagir plus adéquatement

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aux urgences nationales, la Force terrestre créera aussi une capacité d'intervention territoriale dans un minimum de 13 centres urbains, c'est-à-dire Vancouver, Calgary, Regina, Winnipeg, Niagara-Windsor, Toronto, Ottawa, Montréal, Québec, Saint John, Halifax et St. John's. En outre, la Force terrestre, en collaboration avec le COM Canada, recensera les principales capacités de chaque région qui pourraient servir en cas d'urgence nationale. La capacité d'intervention territoriale qui sera mise sur pied ultérieurement comprendra du personnel à temps plein et à temps partiel dans chaque emplacement. Afin d'assurer l'efficacité et l'efficience de cette capacité, la Force terrestre examinera la structure actuelle des unités de la Réserve pour chacun des emplacements mentionnés en vue de regrouper ou d'amalgamer certaines de ces unités s'il y a lieu. Selon les circonstances et suivant les instructions du COM Canada, les bataillons territoriaux pourraient également recevoir le soutien d'autres composantes de la Réserve.»

Il n'est pas étonnant que l'armée se tourne vers la Milice pour mettre sur pied les nouvelles unités d'intervention territoriale». La nouvelle vision élargie exprimée dans l'énoncé de politique et concernant les réserves comprenait un volet de «sécurité intérieure» dans lequel les forces de la Milice «appuieront les autorités civiles lors d'intervention en cas d'urgence sur la scène nationale, grâce à leur expertise en matière d'intervention chimique, biologique, radiologique et nucléaire, ainsi que dans le domaine des opérations d'information et en matière de coopération civilo-militaire». Malgré ses réticences, la Milice a toutes les qualités pour jouer un rôle de force de sécurité intérieure, car la Milice d'aujourd'hui est une force bien structurée et positionnée qui comporte une chaîne de commandement sans équivoque capable de réagir en cas de crise ou de catastrophe naturelle au Canada.

Un rapide coup d'œil sur les unités de milice des villes de Vancouver, Calgary, Regina, Winnipeg, Niagara-Windsor, Toronto, Ottawa, Montréal, Québec, Saint John, Halifax et St.

John's montre qu'il existe 115 régiments comportant la presque totalité de l'effectif de la Milice. L'idée de les fusionner ou de les recycler ne serait pas insensée. Ainsi, le fait «de regrouper ou d'amalgamer» des unités pour assurer une intervention en cas de crise constitue une réponse logique au besoin; mais il subsiste de sérieuses inquiétudes.

Pour commencer, l'idée de donner aux régiments un nouveau rôle d'«intervenant de première ligne» présente des pièges multiples. Deux tentatives de restructuration de la Milice ont fait ressortir régulièrement entre la hiérarchie de la Milice et la Force régulière des lignes de bataille comportant des positions défensives bien établies. Trop souvent, les tentatives de recyclage d'une unité sans adhésion préalable de ses membres et du commandement de la Première réserve en général se heurtent à une résistance farouche. Cette forte résistance politique s'est quelque peu atténuée au cours du dernier siècle, mais elle connaît un regain depuis quelques années par l'action d'un groupe de pression appelé Réserves 2000. Bien que l'influence de ce groupe ne soit plus ce qu'elle a été, on aurait tort de ne pas en tenir compte.

Ensuite, tout projet de réorganisation de la Milice pose le problème du plafonnement des crédits et des effectifs des régiments qui resteront tels quels. Cette question est cruciale, car de nombreux régiments manquent et ont toujours manqué d'effectifs, et ce, pour des raisons budgétaires. Or, le recyclage d'un régiment signifie que les autres régiments de la ville ou de la région devront prendre en charge des responsabilités nouvelles pour ne pas que l'ensemble de l'armée s'en ressente. De plus, le recyclage d'une unité de la Milice comprenant du «personnel à temps plein et à temps partiel» suppose qu'on dispose des effectifs nécessaires. Or, actuellement, toutes les personnes compétentes sont déjà utilisées. Toute tentative visant à retirer des personnes occupant des postes nationaux, surtout des

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postes de commandement subalternes ou supérieurs, pour les réaffecter à de nouveaux postes régionaux ne ferait qu'aggraver la crise des effectifs.

Enfin, il ne faut pas oublier que le niveau de formation nécessaire pour fournir une réaction adéquate en cas d'incident nucléaire, chimique ou biologique dépasse de loin le niveau des membres de la Première réserve. Il faut donc comprendre que la formule ne peut fonctionner que moyennant une formation spécialisée complétée par des interactions régulières avec des groupes d'intervention de première ligne de la communauté.

Les bataillons territoriaux comme voie de l'avenir

Malgré ces difficultés, l'idée d'un bataillon territorial est-elle prometteuse? L'histoire montre que oui, et que la Milice a un rôle central à jouer dans ce projet. Cependant, dans un article publié dans l'*Ottawa Sun*, l'historien militaire Jack Granatstein est cité comme co-auteur d'un rapport qui pose la question suivante : «Qu'est-ce qui est prévu en cas de grand tremblement de terre en Colombie-Britannique? Qu'est-ce qui est prévu en cas de tsunami sur la côte est?» Granatstein conclut que les réserves de l'Armée de terre, de la Marine et de la Force aérienne ne savent pas communiquer entre elles pour la planification en cas de crise. Faisant écho au rôle de «survie nationale» des années 1950, les auteurs du rapport poursuivent en ces termes : «En cas d'attentat terroriste à Toronto, Montréal ou Vancouver, la présence d'un ou deux milliers de réservistes entraînés [serait] certainement inestimable pour les autorités civiles qui chercheront à préserver l'ordre public et pour les tâches de sauvetage, de confinement et de nettoyage.»

Soulignons que la *Loi sur la défense nationale* décrit les circonstances dans lesquelles les FC peuvent être mobilisées. Or, ce genre d'intervention n'aura lieu que si les FC ont des compétences que n'ont plus les communautés touchées. Seule exception : en tant que gestionnaire des «biens fédéraux», le commandant d'une unité de milice peut

mobiliser son régiment pour protéger «l'intégrité physique» des citoyens canadiens. Mais même dans ce cas, la durée du déploiement de l'armée est limitée par des règles très strictes. Le bataillon territorial pourrait constituer la solution.

Le concept de «disponibilité opérationnelle élevée»

Pour qu'un bataillon territorial soit efficace, il faudrait que sa structure s'inspire de celle d'un régiment d'infanterie. Le recyclage d'un régiment dans chacune des villes désignées pourrait fournir cette structure. Cependant, la structure ne sert à rien si on n'a personne pour la commander. Aussi le régiment désigné aurait-il besoin d'être appuyé par du personnel possédant une disponibilité opérationnelle élevée et appartenant à d'autres régiments de la région. Encore une fois, on peut citer en exemple le modèle de l'exercice de brigade, dans lequel un régiment unique se voit confier des postes de leadership clés appuyés par du personnel d'autres régiments. En s'inspirant du modèle régimentaire pour le bataillon territorial, on pourrait jouir des capacités de leadership nécessaires, surtout si l'on crée des postes pouvant être pourvus par du personnel (de la Force régulière et de la Réserve) affecté pour une durée limitée.

En principe, chaque régiment canadien entretiendrait à tour de rôle une ou des section(s) en disponibilité opérationnelle élevée. La section en disponibilité opérationnelle élevée serait composée de soldats disposés et prêts à intervenir sans délai dans un théâtre d'opérations intérieur. Pour ce faire, il faudrait remplir les conditions suivantes :

- Chaque membre de la section devrait satisfaire au niveau trois du GAD18 dans les deux premiers mois de l'année d'entraînement. Cet entraînement comprendrait une formation au NMC19 et un bilan de santé. Tous les documents administratifs seraient remplis et classés.
- Tout le matériel nécessaire à un déploiement en 48 heures serait conservé dans les manèges militaires.

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Bataillons Territoriaux, La Voie De L'Avenir? (Suite)

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- Chaque membre serait prêt en tout temps à se rendre à un endroit prédéterminé dans un délai de deux heures.
- Les membres de la section auraient un soir supplémentaire de formation spécifique par mois pour cette mission, en plus de leurs obligations courantes.

Le principal avantage de la mise sur pied d'une section en disponibilité opérationnelle élevée serait de fournir un point d'ancrage sur place en cas d'urgence de niveau local ou exigeant l'intervention de la brigade. Par la mise en commun des ressources, le commandant de brigade pourrait rapidement constituer un bataillon dont les éléments proviendraient de toutes les unités du secteur de la brigade, c'est-à-dire un bataillon territorial. Pour que ce système fonctionne, il faudrait que le régiment désigné comme fer de lance du bataillon territorial intègre des exercices spécifiques au programme d'entraînement de la brigade et soit appuyé au niveau de la brigade. Mais pour cela, il faut du personnel et de l'argent.

Il existe toutefois une condition implicite, c'est que tous les membres d'un bataillon territorial soient des volontaires. Cette condition pose un problème en particulier pour les postes de leadership, car il faut alors viser en général des personnes d'âge mûr ayant des engagements et des emplois à temps plein. Si on part des chiffres de Statistique Canada selon lesquels 75 % de la population active est au service d'entreprises de moins de 50 employés, on conclura rapidement que l'État serait malvenu de ravir des employés dont la présence est déterminante dans le fonctionnement des PME. Par ailleurs, comme la protection des emplois est de compétence provinciale et non fédérale, il serait assez illusoire de compter sur l'adoption d'une loi identique — ou similaire — à la grandeur du pays, quoique, il faut l'admettre, on observe des progrès récents. Cela dit, la protection des emplois pourrait ne pas constituer un problème aussi grand qu'on le dit, puisque — comme il est arrivé lors de la tempête de verglas — le secteur affecté serait «fermé

jusqu'à nouvel ordre» de toute façon. Ainsi, on peut appeler le réserviste pour une affectation de courte durée sans nuire gravement au petit employeur.

Affectation de courte durée

Puisque le scénario le plus probable serait celui où la Milice fournirait un corps discipliné de militaires qui aideraient au nettoyage et assureraient la sécurité en cas de catastrophe naturelle, il faudrait modifier les lois provinciales concernant les mesures d'urgence. Pour permettre les affectations de courte durée (moins de 30 jours), il faudrait que les emplois des miliciens qui se portent volontaires soient protégés. Si ce genre de protection est présenté dans le cadre des lois de mesures d'urgence, il est plus probable que les provinces y consentent, puisque, de toute façon, les établissements des régions touchées fermentaient pendant la période où l'on a besoin des réservistes.

Le plus grand avantage de cette mesure réside dans le fait que les personnes qui ne se porteraient pas volontaires normalement (sous-officiers supérieurs et officiers ayant une carrière dans le civil) seraient plus enclins à le faire, ce qui fournirait la structure de leadership de base nécessaire à la réussite des opérations. Dans le droit fil des forces traditionnelles de la réserve, la connaissance du terrain et du milieu qu'ont les soldats de la milice apporterait à l'opération des chances de réussite plus grandes que si l'on faisait appel à la Force régulière. Il n'empêche que des pelotons de la Force régulière pourraient être affectés dans certains secteurs pour servir de troupes d'appoint, fournir une assistance technique et jouer un rôle de TACON21 auprès du commandant local de la milice qui, de concert avec les autorités locales, dirigerait les opérations. En cas de catastrophe naturelle, l'armée resterait en retrait et n'interviendrait que sur demande. Cependant, en cas d'attentat terroriste, l'armée prendrait l'initiative pour faire jouer ses compétences uniques : sécurité des sites protégés, patrouilles, postes d'observation, aide au pouvoir civil.

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Cette importance accrue du commandant de la Milice par rapport au commandant de la Force régulière, cadre bien avec une loi adoptée récemment en Ontario visant la création de conseils de mesures d'urgence dans chaque communauté ontarienne. Pour renforcer la capacité de ces conseils et y intégrer les compétences militaires, chaque conseil comporterait un représentant militaire du régiment local. Au sein du Secteur du Centre de la Force terrestre (SCFT), cette directive a déjà été transmise à chaque régiment et a été bien reçue par les communautés. Dans le Secteur de l'Ouest (SOFT), toutefois, on observe une certaine résistance.

Pour que cette approche soit fonctionnelle, il faut que chaque régiment commence à mener des exercices annuels d'assistance aux autorités civiles de concert avec les autorités locales pour assurer l'interopérabilité civilo-militaire. On peut citer comme exemple l'exercice *Red Dragon*, mené chaque année aux États-Unis. Cet exercice consiste à regrouper des unités de la Réserve et de la Garde nationale américaines avec les autorités civiles dans des simulations de catastrophes naturelles et d'événements terroristes. Ce genre d'exercice, au Canada, permettrait aux communautés de constater les capacités de l'armée et de tisser des liens entre les autorités civiles et militaires. Quels sont les obstacles à ce genre d'entreprise? Toujours le même vieil ennemi à trois visages, soit le manque d'argent, de personnel et de volonté politique.

Conclusion

Trois réalités doivent être prises en considération lorsque l'on envisage la réorganisation de la Première réserve pour constituer des bataillons territoriaux. Premièrement, il y a ce qui existe déjà. Nous pensons ici à la structure de la Première réserve, à celle de la Force régulière et à la répartition actuelle des rôles entre les deux. Ensuite, il y a la façon dont les deux systèmes s'appuient l'un sur l'autre par les renforcements, le recrutement et les mutations. Enfin, il y a la zone grise qui

recouvre les conditions nécessaires pour que l'armée puisse répondre aux demandes qui lui sont adressées. Ce dernier point est celui dont on parle le plus souvent mais au sujet duquel on a le moins écrit.

«L'argent n'est jamais un problème» lorsque l'on sait clairement ce qu'on veut et que l'objectif est réalisable. Cela dit, l'argent est le nerf de la guerre, et il est temps qu'on le reconnaisse. Sans apport de fonds, toute tentative de réorganisation se résumera, comme d'habitude, à un simple jeu de chaise musicale qui n'apporte rien sinon un peu plus d'animosité.

La volonté politique, quant à elle, demeure un oiseau rare. Tout politicien tenté de jouer avec une tradition militaire datant de plusieurs décennies s'expose à un aller simple pour les oubliettes. Inversement, un leader militaire qui tente d'obtenir un appui politique pour une cause donnée risque de se retrouver inopinément dans la fosse aux lions.

Reste la question du personnel. L'armée a déjà du mal à maintenir ses effectifs et à répondre aux besoins actuels. Il ne serait pas réaliste de s'engager dans la création de bataillons qui viendraient s'ajouter aux unités en place. Par contre, il est tout à fait envisageable de recycler une unité existante pour répondre aux besoins de la communauté en cas d'urgence. La création de bataillons territoriaux alimentés par des volontaires en provenance des régiments de la région est une solution sensée, puisqu'elle a peu de conséquences sur l'effectif. Mais surtout, une longue histoire d'exercices de brigade prouve que le modèle régimentaire est efficace.

Cela dit, le recyclage doit être approché avec précaution, car les gardiens de la tradition sont toujours prêts à riposter contre toute action pouvant porter atteinte à une image et à des traditions que la milice chérit depuis longtemps. Bien que tout le monde soit prêt à réorganiser la Milice pour répondre aux besoins de la Force régulière, rares sont ceux

The English version of this article may be found on the Canadian Army Journal's website at:
http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_11/iss_2/CAJ_Vol11.2_08_e.pdf

There's no midlife like it

ERIN ANDERSEN

The Globe and Mail February 21

This past Wednesday afternoon, Russell Crowhurst raised his hand to swear allegiance to the Queen and became a private in the Canadian Forces.

His car is ready to go into storage. His landlord has his notice. He has said goodbye to the students at the Calgary elementary school where he has worked as a teacher's aide for 12 years, explaining that, as an army medic, he signed up "not to put bullets in people, but to take them out." His 12-year-old daughter, who lives with her mom, has given her approval, if reluctantly. And he has wisely removed his earrings: "I thought I'd do that before I got shouted at."

One week from today, he will arrive at the Saint-Jean Garrison in Quebec and enter into 15 weeks of crack-of-dawn marches, push-ups and combat training to become a medic – at the age of 42.

The shouting, he says, he can handle, but the push-ups have him worried. "I'm a typical Calgarian," he says. "I drive everywhere." He doesn't have a middle-aged paunch to grapple with – standing 5-foot-10, he's a lean 136 pounds – and the army has decided he's someone it can "knock into shape." Still, he worries about being the weak link in his platoon. At his official swearing-in, nearly every other new recruit in the room was young enough to have been his son. But age, he tells himself, also has its advantages: "I have been ironing shirts for 30 years. They, most probably, have never ironed a shirt."

Private Crowhurst is joining the small but growing ranks of Canadians lacing up combat boots to begin army life just as their hair is showing signs of grey.

As demand in the rest of the economy slackens, the need for soldiers continues to rise. While Canada's Afghanistan commitment is slated to end in 2011, U.S. President Barack Obama's joint press conference with Prime Minister Stephen Harper in Ottawa on

Thursday seemed to leave the door open for another extension.

Whether inspired to serve their country or simply seeking a stable paycheque, people over 40 are enlisting in the Canadian Forces at twice the rate they did five years ago. While such enlistments still numbered only 226 in 2008 – very few compared to new soldiers under 30 – the count probably will increase as the economy continues to falter.

And already this year, one of those recent over-40 recruits has died on deployment – in January, Trooper Brian Good, 43, was killed by a roadside bomb, leaving behind his wife and two young daughters.

To find and keep potential soldiers among an aging population, restrictions have been changed. In most parts of the U.S. military, the maximum age to enlist is now 42, up from 35. In Canada, mandatory retirement was raised to 60 from 55, giving people who sign up later in life the time to earn a pension. There's no maximum age to sign up in Canada, though a recruit has to be able to complete a certain number of years service before retiring. According to a recruiting spokesperson, the oldest soldier to enlist was 54 years old.

In recent months, officers at recruitment centres across the country report more people walking through their doors asking questions – a common side effect of a recession.

South of the border, the military has already been a beneficiary of bad times; in 2008, it was reported that both the regular forces and reserves achieved their recruiting goals for the first time in four years.

However, the Canadian Forces are trying to expand to 70,000 people from 65,000 (counting both regular forces and reserves). That means finding more men and woman willing to serve – a particular challenge in an educated, urban country such as Canada.

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The military has tried to entice people into uniform with signing bonuses for skilled trades and professions, and by targeting specific groups, such as aboriginal people.

However, recruiting numbers released this week by the Department of National Defence suggest that the call to service is having only mixed results: New recruits heading off to basic training are only barely replacing the soldiers handing in their uniforms, particularly trained personnel leaving for jobs in the private sector and those who have served long enough to collect a pension.

According to the report, the focus in the future will be on providing better child care and other support for soldiers' families and more consideration around deployment and relocation – just the approach that could make the military more appealing for middle-aged recruits searching for a new career.

Canada's is among several national militaries that have loosened fitness standards recently. Prospective soldiers are no longer required to pass a fitness test – a good physical is enough to get you into uniform. As Pte. Crowhurst will soon find out, the whipping-into-shape part happens once you're wearing it.

But making it possible for people to enlist is only one issue, suggests Deborah Cowen, the author of *Military Workfare: The Soldier and Social Citizenship in Canada*, which was published last year. Society also needs to consider the reasons why they choose to do so.

The University of Toronto geography professor points out that recruits, particularly for the lower ranks, tend to come from rural towns, with fewer education and employment choices. In the early years of the Afghanistan conflict, 25 per cent of casualties were from Newfoundland.

Recruitment began to drop steeply in the 1960s as education levels increased, people moved into cities and universal government benefits and coverage in private employment improved.

But in recent years, Prof. Cowen says, cuts to welfare and job instability have made army life look like a better bet again. In an economic downturn, a soldier's uniform may become the only option for a unemployed parent with bills to pay.

“Do we really want to create a situation where the military is the only reliable source of employment for certain groups?” she asks. A recession “wouldn't seem to create a labour force that wants to be there. They want to get out as soon as they can get out.”

But Colonel Matthew Overton, commander of the Canadian Forces Recruiting Group, says that is a simplistic perspective. “There are a broad range of people showing interest in the forces for a whole host of reasons,” he says.

“I would be foolish to say the economy plays no role, but I don't think it has been the single driver.”

For example, he says, a 52-year-old man e-mailed him recently to say he was proud of the troops overseas and wanted to serve his country.

And military recruiters stress that they are not interested in people who sign up to stave off bankruptcy and who are more likely to leave after expensive training. The Canadian Forces already lose many new recruits before the first year.

Says Richard Rhodes, a naval lieutenant in the Halifax recruiting centre, “We want people who want to be here.”

Second time around

The military is not as Wilfred Mallette remembers it his first time – 26 years ago. When he was 18, and living in the United States because of his father's work, he signed up for the army. It was a good way to build some skills, he says.

He remembers pulling up on the bus on the first day, and red-faced drill sergeants sprinting aboard, tossing people and bags out the door.

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There's no midlife like it (Cont'd)

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"It was like they hit you with a sledgehammer and if you survived it, great, you were in," he recalls.

He stayed only a few years before heading back to Canada to train as an air-traffic controller. Eventually, he ended up in Prince Edward Island, where he and his wife, Sherry, ran several souvenir shops.

But when the economy cut into the tourist market, business fell off and he began looking for other options. It seemed unlikely he would get a full-time job as an air-traffic controller without seniority. And that's how he came to consider donning a uniform again, this time for his own country – the job meant a stable salary and good benefits for his family.

Now, at 44, he is in his seventh week of officer training at Saint-Jean Garrison. He will be a second lieutenant when he is done, working as an aerospace controller.

So far, he says, "I'm holding up better than I expected." On arrival, he was not yanked off the bus but led quietly into a classroom for orientation.

Still, it has been an adjustment. He shares a bathroom with fellow recruits that tease him with nicknames like "Grumpy Old Man" or "Old Goat."

Going into boot camp, he dropped 70 pounds – "it was goodbye fast food, hello gym" – but it's still tough, he admits, to keep up with 23-year-olds on a 5 a.m. run.

While he may not be as spry as the other members of his unit, his extra years carry their own benefits, he says. "People that come in with a few more years bring certain skills and experience that you would otherwise be unable to attain getting into the military at 18."

But the structure of military life, after 20 years as a civilian, takes some getting used to. "It's a world of difference from being my own boss to falling back into being the low man on the totem poll."

Mostly, though, he misses his wife and kids. "The hardest part is being without family." His oldest is in university; his youngest is in Grade 1. They talk on the telephone every few days.

If seeking stability for their families draws some older Canadians to the military, it is often also family obligations that have deterred them from donning a uniform earlier in life.

It was not economics that drew Captain Yvette Menard to the military at the age of 47 – her children grown, she wanted a bit of adventure and the chance to make a difference.

When she had two kids to raise and a military husband who was already travelling, signing up was not an option. After her divorce, she studied to become a dentist. But a few years into running her own practice, she began to investigate the prospect of leaving "civvy street."

She loathed the paperwork and the hassle when patients cancelled or staff were sick. In the military, she figured, dentists could just concentrate on fixing teeth and leave the red tape to someone else. And even approaching 50, she was in good shape from her years as a lifeguard.

This week, she got a taste of the challenge she was seeking – spending several days out in the field near Saint Jean, sleeping on a cot and taking her first live-ammunition target test. (She passed.) She is now halfway through basic training and, despite her worries, her knees or ankles haven't given out on her.

"I am stronger than I thought I was," she said. "But I need to work on my patience living with people in a big group. I have lived alone for a long time."

She is hoping eventually to be deployed to Afghanistan, to see how dentistry is conducted in the field, though she would particularly like to go in the reconstruction phase to help retrain female dentists in the country, or to provide dental care to families who have not had access to it.

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Her two children, now in their 20s, are not very pro-military, but, she says, “they are very pro-Mom.”

She will admit that at her age, basic training seems like an extreme step to get out of paperwork. “I think it's a midlife crisis,” she jokes. “I couldn't afford a sports car.”

Found and lost

But serving in the military carries risks far greater than twisted knees in boot camp, of course. Just days before Trooper Brian Good became one of the 108 Canadians to die so far on the Afghan mission, his family had been talking about taking a vacation together – the first one they had been able to afford since the Goods' honeymoon 20 years earlier.

Trooper Good was 43 – he enlisted at 40, wanting to go to Afghanistan. “He just couldn't get over there fast enough,” says his widow, Sandra.

He had spent most of his life skipping from job to job. He had been a printer and a driver for the disabled, steered a transport truck through Ottawa's streets and fixed homes in a small business with his brother.

“He had been searching his whole life for something meaningful,” says Ms. Good, who has worked for the same insurance company for 20 years. Many times, the two of them would talk late into the night, imagining the perfect job – something steady that also had real purpose.

Then in 2005, her husband was dropping a friend off at CFB Petawawa. He wandered into the recruiting office. When a recruiter asked if he was interested, he brushed him off: “I'm too old,” he said. But that night, he came home with the enlistment forms.

It all seemed to fall together – the job had both meaning and good benefits. And in a family of five brothers, he was the one who had always treasured his father's air force cap and medals.

Ms. Good had moved around most of her childhood in a military family, and she had sworn she would never marry an army guy.

But she had never seen her husband so excited: He quit smoking to get in shape, and within months he was in basic training, his first time ever away from his family. It was clear that he had finally “found his niche.”

Even now, says Ms. Good, she could not have denied him that.

Packing up his life in Calgary, Pte. Crowhurst knows he, too, may find himself in Afghanistan one day. He is honest about his misgivings – though he worries more about his daughter than for himself.

“I thought about it a lot beforehand,” he says. “But I wasn't prepared to say no because of Afghanistan.”

He is looking forward to seeing new parts of Canada – he's lived nowhere but Alberta since he arrived from Britain 18 years ago. Much as he liked teaching, he felt unconnected to life in Calgary, and wanted a job that provided community beyond a few hours a day.

He is still adjusting to his new rank and the prospect of basic training. “I really haven't gotten my head around this yet,” he says. Maybe, he jokes, they'll send him home after a few weeks. Or maybe he'll find what he's



First Salute from Mount Royal

Published in "Defence Canada" March 1949

The following extract from an editorial in the "Montreal Transcript" of November 11, 1862, refers to the following incident:

"The twenty-first birthday of His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales falling this year on Sunday, the celebration of the day took place yesterday. The unfavourable weather prevented any public celebration by the troops in garrison except the firing of a royal salute from the Island of St. Helen's which took place at noon.

"The celebration of the day by the Montreal Field Battery, under Major Stevenson, however, was possessed of novel features, which are likely to make this day memorable, apart from the interest which every British subject attaches to it. The indefatigable major is sure to have some novelty in store, when he attempts anything with his efficient battery. Yesterday the new feature was the firing of a salute in honour of the attainment of majority by our beloved Prince, from the summit of Mount Royal, eight hundred feet above the St. Lawrence." The feat was accomplished not without difficulty.

The Battery was ordered to muster for special duty at nine o'clock in the morning, and the men were promptly present at the Crystal Palace. The guns were dismounted from the carriages, and mounted again on sleighs, and, at eleven o'clock, they took up the line of march with four guns drawn by six horses each. They proceeded through Mr. Redpath's avenues, and hence by a winding path, extremely rugged, and much obstructed by trees and stumps, which were removed by the artillerymen, and after having several guns upset and righted again, to the plateau overlooking the city.

"At twelve o'clock precisely a royal salute was fired, after which the men and officers partook of a lunch composed of cold roast beef, ham, etc., with bread and hot coffee. It is needless to say that justice was done to the viands, for the labour of the morning and the march were keen appetizers. At one o'clock a salute of one

hundred guns was fired in from 15 to 20 minutes, when the men again rested a short time, concluding the business of the day with three salvos from the four guns.

The horses were then attached to the pieces, and the descent of the mountain made at the same point, after which they proceeded through St. Catherine Street and St. Denis Street to Notre Dame, and about three o'clock arrived at the Crystal Palace.

"The scene presented on the plateau of the mountain, as viewed from the city, was picturesque in the extreme. The dark uniforms of the men, with the white background of snow, and the belching smoke from the guns, were too prominent not to attract hundreds to the street corners affording a view of the scene. The reports were borne towards the city by the wind with deafening distinctness, and when the salvos were fired the reverberation was repeated several times.

"The Montreal Field Battery have linked their names to the future, if no opportunity is afforded them of proving their efficiency in the field, at least of having fired the first gun in history from the summit of the mountain."

Plus Ancien Régiment (Suite)

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se pratique occasionnellement en fin de semaine, au camp de St-Jérôme; ce qui leur permet de passer deux jours à respirer l'air pur des Laurentides et à connaître un peu ce qu'est la vie de caserne.

La cantine des hommes est ouverte tous les vendredi soirs pour qu'ils y puissent recevoir leurs amis et amies. De plus, en conformité avec les ordres du brigadier J. M. Cape, MBE, commandant de l'artillerie de la troisième division, une fois par mois il y a une danse organisée pour tous les hommes du régiment accompagnés de leurs amis et amies.

Il semble qu'on puisse conclure qu'au 2^e Méd, les recrues obtiennent un entraînement

Plus Ancien Régiment D'Artillerie au Canada

« Defence Canada » mars 1949

Le deuxième régiment d'artillerie moyenne, de d'artillerie royale canadienne (2 Med. Regt. RCA), avec quartiers-généraux au manège militaire de la rue Craig, se glorifie avec juste titre d'être le plus vieux régiment d'artillerie au Canada, ayant été formé le 27 novembre 1856.

Après s'être couvert de gloire durant la première guerre mondiale, il participa aux campagnes de Sicile, Italie et d'Europe au cours de la dernière guerre.



Lieutenant-colonel E. W. Tremblay, DSO, ED

Après la démobilisation, le régiment fut réorganisé sur une base de réserve et, en septembre 1946, le commandement fut confié au lieutenant-colonel Édouard W. Tremblay, DSO, ED. Les autorités supérieures auraient difficilement pu faire un choix plus heureux. Le colonel Tremblay avait servi comme jeune officier d'artillerie

de réserve pendant quelques années avant la guerre et, dès le début des hostilités, il quitta son bureau d'architecte pour se joindre à l'armée active. Il participe à l'invasion du continent comme commandant de la 58^{ième} batterie. Cette batterie, recrutée surtout à Québec et chez les Acadiens des provinces maritimes, formait, avec la 50^{ième} batterie de Montréal, le 4^{ième} régiment d'artillerie moyenne (4 Med. Regt. RCA).

Il était tout naturel que le colonel s'adjoignit des officiers et sous-officiers de son ancien régiment et la majorité d'entre eux proviennent du régiment qu'ils se plaisaient à appeler le 4 ^M Médé.

Tous portent les divers rubans de service en campagne, et trois d'entre eux ont été décorés de la croix militaire : ce sont le major Lewis P. Martin, commandant de la 50^{ième} batterie, le capitaine Yvon Thériault, officier de la force permanente, et le capitaine J. A. Lucien

Clermont, padre du régiment.

Les sous-officiers sont sous la charge de "Larry" West, le sergent-major régimentaire, un artilleur de quinze ans d'expérience, parmi les mieux qualifiés de l'armée canadienne.

Les recrues du régiment sont des jeunes gens de 18 à 21 ans qui en sont à leur première expérience de l'armée et de la vie militaire. Il est vrai que les parades régulières n'ont lieu qu'un soir par semaine, le mercredi, mais les officiers et sous-officiers tentent de leur montrer les manœuvres élémentaires du canon moyen, sans oublier les principes de base de la manœuvre à pied, du tir à la carabine, etc.

L'armée du régiment est un canon dont le calibre peut être soit de 5.5 pouces, soit de 4.5 pouces, suivant le cas. Il n'y a qu'une différence entre ces deux canons, c'est la grosseur du baril. L'un, le 4.5, peut projeter un obus de 55 livres à une distance maximum de 22,000 verges, tandis que le 5.5 tire deux sortes de projectiles: un obus de 80 livres, à une distance maximum de 19,500 verges, et un obus de 100 livres, à une distance maximum de 17,000 verges. Comme le 5.5 est l'arme moyenne officiellement en usage au Canada, c'est de cette arme que ce sert le 2 Med. Regt.

Il ne faudrait pas croire qu'il n'y a que de l'entraînement militaire qui se fasse au régiment. Les autorités des quartiers-généraux ont cru à juste titre que de toujours travailler sans jamais s'amuser ne saurait former des soldats heureux de leur sort, et suivant leurs instructions, une partie des soirées de parade est consacrée aux sports. Le quartier-maître, le capitaine R. Racine, se fait toujours un plaisir de distribuer aux hommes l'équipement requis pour jouer à la balle-molle, au ballon à la volée ou au badminton.

Les vendredis soirs les équipes de balle-molle et de ballon à la volée participant aux joutes disputées dans les ligues de l'artillerie. Il faut croire que le capitaine "Mike" Clapin, officier des sports, a bien su entraîner ses hommes car les deux équipes sont en tête de leur ligue respective.

L'un des exercices que les hommes semblent apprécier le plus est l'entraînement en ski qui

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**L'Association de l'Artillerie de
Montréal
Artillery Association of Montreal**

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Director	LCol J.F. Stirling
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Further Memories (Cont'd)

(Continued from page 13)

raining.

Sept 22 Driver and officer injured when the truck hit a Teller mine. Officer from each Battery to Riccione to look for billets. We were to get a rest.

Sept 23 Move out at 1800 hrs. Arrived at position at 0200 hrs. Maintenance of equipment. Florence designated as leave area.

Sept 24 ,25 and 26 Maintenance and leave to Florence.

Sept 27 8th. Battery sent another 45 men in two trucks to Florence. On a mountain road one truck fell over the side to the bottom of the ravine. Four killed and sixteen wounded.

Sept 28 Colonel Ralston visited the Regiment. (Minister of Defence?) Colonel Hague, former commanding officer, who had lost his arm in action, also visited.

Sept 29 Orders to return to action. A shock (we had a better word for it. %% \$\$\$#@!@BRASS). Half the men on leave.

Sept 30 Regiment prepares to move. 800 rounds of ammunition already

Annual Visit to Ste-Anne's Hospital



From left to right: Hon Lcol Charles de Kovachich; Hon Col Pierre Fecteau; past Hon Col Bill Cloutier

